Citizen Participation in Japanese Criminal Trials: Reimagining the Right to Trial by Jury in the United States by McClanahan, Jon P.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 37 | Number 3 Article 3
Spring 2012
Citizen Participation in Japanese Criminal Trials:
Reimagining the Right to Trial by Jury in the United
States
Jon P. McClanahan
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jon P. McClanahan, Citizen Participation in Japanese Criminal Trials: Reimagining the Right to Trial by Jury in the United States, 37 N.C. J.
Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 725 (2011).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol37/iss3/3
Citizen Participation in Japanese Criminal Trials: Reimagining the Right to
Trial by Jury in the United States
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This article is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/
ncilj/vol37/iss3/3
Citizen Participation in Japanese Criminal Trials:
Reimagining the Right to Trial by Jury in the United
States
Jon P. McClanahanf
I. Introduction .......................... ...... 726
II. Right to Trial by Jury in Early America ....... ...... 729
A. The Significance of Juries in Colonial America.........730
B. The Founders' Conception of the Right to Trial by
Jury.............................734
C. Jury Trials at the Time of the Founding and Today....738
1. Roles of Judge and Jury in Deciding Issues of
Law ...............................738
2. Division of Labor in Rendering Verdicts and
Imposing Punishment .................... 741
3. Defendant's Right to Waive Trial by Jury......743
III. Citizen Participation in the Japanese Criminal Justice
System ......................... ....... 746
A. Previous Attempts at Trial by Jury in Japan...............746
B. Laying the Groundwork for Citizen Participation......753
IV. Adoption and Implementation of the Saiban-in Seido......761
A. Justice System Reform Council Deliberations and
Recommendations .................. ...... 762
B. Features of the Saiban-in Seido ........... ........ 766
C. Initial Impact of the Saiban-in Seido on the
Japanese Judicial System ................... 770
V. Evaluating the Saiban-in Seido in Light of the
Founders' Conception of the Right to Trial by Jury..........774
A. Citizen Participation in Deciding Issues of Law.........775
1. Advantages ........................... 775
2. Drawbacks . ........................... 777
3. Recommendations ................. ..... 779
B. Mixed Court and Joint Decision-making as to Guilt
and Punishment ..................... ..... 781
tClinical Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law; J.D.,
University of North Carolina School of Law. The author wishes to thank Ruth Sheehan
and Dr. Seiko Okada for their individual research contributions as well as Leah
Richardson for her assistance throughout the revision process.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
1. Advantages ..................... ...... 781
2. Drawbacks . ...................... ..... 783
3. Recommendations ................ ...... 787
C. Defendant's Inability to Waive Trial by Saiban-in
Panel .......... . ................ .... 788
1. Advantages ...................... ..... 788
2. Drawbacks. ...................... ..... 789
3. Recommendations ................. ..... 791
VI. Conclusion................................791
I. Introduction
If the United States were to reform contemporary jury trials to
match the Founders' conception of the right to trial by jury, how
might they look? In recent years, we have gained insight into how
to answer that question from an unlikely source: Japan.
On August 3, 2009, millions of people across Japan tuned in to
witness the first criminal trial brought under the new saiban-in
seido' ("quasi-jury system" or "lay judge system").2 After the
four-day murder trial, a panel of six citizen jurors and three
professional judges rendered a guilty verdict and sentenced the
defendant to fifteen years imprisonment.' The citizens serving on
I There has been debate regarding how to properly translate the phrase saiban-in
seido. Compare Hiroshi Fukurai, Japan's Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems as
Deliberative Agents of Social Change: De-colonial Strategies and Deliberative
Participatory Democracy, 86 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 789, 789 n.1 (2011) [hereinafter
Fukurai, Japan's Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems] (explaining preference for "quasi-
jury system"), with Zachary Corey & Valerie P. Hans, Japan's New Lay Judge System:
Deliberative Democracy in Action?, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 72, 72 n.4 (2010)
(explaining preference for "lay judge system"). The author does not have a preference
for one term over another and thus will use the term "saiban-in seido" in this Article.
2 See Leo Lewis, Juries Return to Japanese Justice in Katsuyoshi Fujii Trial, THE
TIMES (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news (search "Juries Return to
Japanese Justice;" select first search result) (detailing the widespread interest in the
event); Juries Return to Japanese Courts, THE AGE (Aug. 5, 2009),
http://www.theage.com.au/world/juries-return-to-japanese-courts-20090804-e8kf.html
(noting the turnout at the Tokyo courthouse).
3 See First Japanese Trial for 66 Years Convicts Man of Neighbour's Murder,
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2009, 7:10 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/06/japan-jury-trial-murder. Coverage of the
Katsuyoshi trial was not limited to the trial itself, many articles questioned the basis and
long-term prospects of the saiban-in seido. See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi & Mark
McDonald, Once Again, Trial by Jury in Japan, First Panel Since War Sentences
Murderer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009, at A4 (noting fears expressed by Japanese citizens
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the panel later shared their feelings about the experience publicly,
expressing some trepidation about their role but ultimately
satisfaction with the experience.4
Japan did not set out to adopt wholesale the American jury
system. Still, it was keenly interested in deriving many of the
benefits traditionally associated with the right to trial by jury in the
United States.' These benefits-central to the Founders'
conception of the right to trial by jury-include operating as a
check against governmental overreaching,6 providing a forum for
citizen participation in the democratic process,' and playing a
central role in the administration of justice.' Likewise, the
Founders' conception of the right to trial by jury influenced the
division of responsibility between the judge and jury in trials in
early America.'
While several scholars have explored the influence of the
contemporary American jury system on Japan's adoption of the
saiban-in seido,o there has been little discussion of the potential
influence Japan's jury reforms could have on our own reform
efforts. To the extent that this latter issue has been addressed, the
focus has primarily been on the practical effects of allowing jurors
of participating in such a system and criticisms of the system by legal analysts).
4 See Japan Holds First Jury Trial Since World War II, MSNBC (Aug. 6, 2009,
3:35 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32318045/ns/world-news-asia-pacific
("[Jurors] said it was difficult to decide on the sentence, but they praised the professional
judges, prosecutors and defense for making their arguments easy to follow and avoiding
the use of legal jargon.").
5 See generally infra Part III.B.
6 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 83 (1998) (explaining that to "keep
agents of the central government under control was to use the populist and local
institution of the jury").
7 See id at 94 (explaining the ability of citizens to "participate in the application
of national law through their service on juries").
8 See id. at 96; see also Jon P. McClanahan, The 'True' Right to Trial by Jury: The
Founders' Formulation and Its Demise, I 1 W.VA. L. REV. 791, 808 (2009) (discussing
the Founders' conception of the right to trial by jury).
9 See AMAR, supra note 6, at 83-100 (describing the division of responsibility
between judges and juries in relation to the Founders' conception of the right to trial by
jury).
10 See generally Takuya Katsuta, Japan's Rejection of the American Criminal Jury,
58 AM. J. COMP. L. 497 (2010) (tracing the history of the adoption of the saiban-in seido
and the pervasive influence, but rejection, of the modem American jury system).
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to question witnesses or determine sentencing."
This Article examines the introduction of citizen participation
into the Japanese judicial system from a different perspective.
Rather than focusing on the contemporary American jury system,
this Article evaluates the Japanese reforms in light of the
Founders' conception of the right to trial by jury. It is this
conception of the right to trial by jury, rather than its modem
formulation, that positively influenced the creation and adoption
of the saiban-in seido. Moreover, American legal scholars and
professionals should closely evaluate the reforms in Japan to
determine how aspects of the new Japanese system might be
introduced in the United States to more fully effectuate the
Founders' conception of the right to trial by jury.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II of this Article
describes the Founders' conception of the right to trial by jury.
The conflict between the American colonies and England in the
period leading up to the Revolution shaped the institution of trial
by jury.12 This Part also identifies aspects of jury trials that were
tied to the Founders' conception of this right and describes their
evolution. Part III explores the circumstances in Japan that led to
its push for judicial reform at the end of the twentieth century.
While in some ways the environments in early America and late-
twentieth century Japan are quite different, there are similarities in
the functioning of their respective judicial systems and the
relationship between their citizenry and the judiciary." Because
11 See Daniel Senger, The Japanese Quasi-Jury and the American Jury: A
Comparative Assessment ofJuror Questioning and Sentencing Procedures and Cultural
Elements in Lay Judicial Participation, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 771-72 (2011)
(proposing additional research into the effectiveness of questioning and sentencing
procedures); Douglas G. Levin, Saiban-in-seido: Lost in Translation? How the Source of
Power Underlying Japan's Proposed Lay Assessor System May Determine Its Fate, 10
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 199, 221-22 (2008-2009) (discussing effects of allowing jurors
to question witnesses). This latter article acknowledges that the design of the saiban-in
seido might "allow [] jurors to come closer to deciding legal issues as well as factual
issues." Levin, supra, at 222 (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, the article incorrectly
conflates the historical right of the jury to decide issues of law with the modem-day
doctrine of jury nullification. See id at 223. Nor does the article suggest that the jury's
right to decide issues of law is an essential component of the right to trial by jury. See
id. at 223-25.
12 See infra Part II.
13 See infra Part III.
728 [Vol. XXXVII
REIMAGINING THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
of these similarities, the American Founders and Japanese
reformers had a shared vision of the role that citizen participation
should have in the administration of justice.14 Part IV describes
the saiban-in seido and the process of its adoption. Even though
those charged with reforming the Japanese judicial system looked
closely at the contemporary American jury system, they did not
recommend its adoption." Instead, Japan created a unique system
that combines aspects of the European "mixed court" tribunals and
the American jury system.16 Part V examines several components
of the saiban-in seido in light of the Founders' conception of the
right to trial by jury, including citizen participation in determining
issues of law, the method of joint decision-making in guilt and
sentencing, and the defendant's inability to waive trials subject to
the saiban-in seido. Each of these components contains aspects
that are more in line with the Founders' conception of the right to
trial by jury than our own contemporary system.17 This Part also
explores how aspects of these components could be incorporated
into the American jury system, and it provides recommendations
for how these components could be refined to further reflect the
Founders' conception of the right to trial by jury.
II. Right to Trial by Jury in Early America
Arguably the right to trial by jury was the most prominent
political, social, and cultural construct in America's struggle for
independence and development as a fledgling nation. It is no
surprise that the right to trial by jury is featured in all of the
country's defining documents: the Declaration of Independence,18
the United States Constitution,1 9 and the Bill of Rights. 20  A
14 See infra Part III.
15 See infra Part IV.
16 See infra Part IV.
17 See infra Part V.
18 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776) (including in the
charges against King George III, "[D]epriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial
by Jury").
19 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said
Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial
shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.").
20 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments to the
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comprehensive treatment of the right to trial by jury at the time of
the Founding is beyond the scope of this Article.2' Instead, this
Part traces the historical significance of the right in colonial
America, and in particular its function as a check on paternalistic
and, at times, oppressive English rule. Next, this Part briefly
describes the nature of the right as it existed at the time of the
Founding, focusing on the purposes that trial by jury was meant to
fulfill. Finally, this Part discusses how the right to trial by jury
was implemented at the time of the Founding. Although there
were considerable differences among state and federal courts, this
Part identifies three general trends and compares them to modern
practice.
A. The Significance ofJuries in Colonial America
Initially, the right to trial by jury in colonial America was
circumscribed by its use and function in England. Although jury
trials primarily served an administrative function at the time of
their adoption in eleventh century England,22 they occupied a more
central role in societal governance by the seventeenth century
when American colonial governments began to be established.2 3
Nevertheless, prior to the late seventeenth century, jury trials were
still primarily conceived as a tool for local self-governance.24 At
that time, several cases served to transform the conception of jury
trials from an important tool for deciding private disputes into an
essential check on the judiciary and other branches of government.
United States Constitution concern aspects of the right to trial by jury. This Article will
focus on the Sixth Amendment, which states in relevant part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." Id.
21 See generally ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 77-116 (1930)
(providing more information on the development of the right to trial by jury in the
United States); Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury
Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377 (1996).
22 See Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an
Unappreciated History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 583 (1993); see also Sally Lloyd-Bostock
& Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the "Little Parliament": Juries and Jury Reform in
England and Wales, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8 (1999) (explaining that "[e]arly
juror[s] in England acted as sources of information on local affairs").
23 See Landsman, supra note 22, at 589.
24 See id.
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The first of these landmark cases was Bushell's Case,2 5
decided in 1670. The underlying trial giving rise to Bushell's
Case concerned William Penn and William Mead. 26 The two men
were arrested and prosecuted for congregating to discuss a religion
other than that of the Church of England, which was prohibited by
the Conventicles Act.27 When the jury twice refused to render a
guilty verdict, the court responded:
[Y]ou shall not be dismissed till we have a verdict that the court
will accept; and you shall be locked up, without meat, drink,
fire, and tobacco. You shall not think thus to abuse the court;
we will have a verdict, by the help of God, or you shall starve
for it.28
Despite this admonition, the jury returned a not-guilty
verdict.29  The jurors were held in contempt, fined for their
conduct, and those who refused to pay were imprisoned." Edward
Bushell, one of the jurors who had been imprisoned, petitioned for
a writ of habeas corpus.31 In granting the petition, Judge Vaughan
ruled that no juror could be punished merely for rendering a
verdict contrary to the opinion of the court.3 2 In reaching this
conclusion, Vaughan noted that "the judge and jury might honestly
differ in the result from the evidence, as well as two judges may,
which often happens."
Bushell's Case had a profound influence on both English and
colonial American juries. First, it curtailed judicial coercion over
jury decision-making, which had theretofore been commonplace in
25 Bushell's Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006. See generally THOMAS ANDREW
GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL
TRIAL JURY 1200-1800, 200-64 (1985) (providing a detailed account of the case).
26 GREEN, supra note 25, at 202.
27 Id. at 202-03.
28 Penn and Mead's Case, (1670) 6 How. State Tr. 951, 962-63.
29 See GREEN, supra note 25, at 225; see also Thomas Regnier, Restoring the
Founders' Ideal of the Independent Jury in Criminal Cases, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
775, 794 (2011).
30 See GREEN, supra note 25, at 231-32; see also Regnier, supra note 29, at 794.
31 See Bushell's Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006.
32 See id
33 Id.
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England.3 4  Second, it solidly established the jury's power to
nullify unjust laws and arguably to decide issues of law." Third,
the unique subject matter of the underlying dispute highlighted the
jury's power to decide issues of great significance to other
branches of government and to operate as a check on government
oppression.36
On the heels of Bushell's Case, English courts attempted to
quell the jury's power by narrowly framing the issues jurors would
decide, particularly in seditious libel cases." In the Seven
Bishops' Case,3 8 a jury returned an acquittal in a seditious libel
case brought against Anglican bishops who signed a letter in
protest of James II's Declaration of Indulgences being read in
their churches.39 This case further solidified the jury's
independence from the judiciary and its role in "opposition to
tyranny."40
Although the right to trial by jury began to transform in
England at the end of the seventeenth century, the right took on an
even more significant role in colonial America in the decades
leading up to its independence from England.4 1 The prominence
of the colonial jury was epitomized by the 1735 trial of John Peter
Zenger, who was charged with seditious libel for publishing a
newspaper that criticized the Crown-appointed governor of New
34 See Smith, supra note 21, at 408 (explaining that Bushell's Case "cemented [the
English jury's] position as a guarantor of liberty in the face of state oppression").
35 See Andrew J. Parmenter, Nullifying the Jury: "The Judicial Oligarchy"
Declares War on Jury Nullification, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 381-82 (2007) (noting the
importance of Bushell's Case in establishing jury nullification); see also Simon Stem,
Note, Between Local Knowledge and National Politics: Debating Rationales for Jury
Nullification After Bushell's Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815, 1815-16 (2002) (explaining how
Bushell's Case was later interpreted as supporting a jury's right to decide issues of law).
36 See Smith, supra note 21, at 408; see also J. R. Pole, "A Quest of Thoughts":
Representation and Moral Agency in the Early Anglo-American Jury, in "THE DEAREST
BIRTH RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND": THE JURY IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 126 (John W. Cairns & Grant McLeod eds., 2002) (discussing the significance of
Vaughan's opinion in establishing the independence of the jury from the judiciary).
37 Landsman, supra note 22, at 590.
38 The Trial of the Seven Bishops, (1688) 12 How. State Tr. 183.
39 See GREEN, supra note 25, at 320; see also Landsman, supra note 22, at 590-91.
40 GREEN, supra note 25, at 320-21 (discussing the importance of the Seven
Bishops' Case in establishing jury nullification in England).
41 See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 32 (1986).
732 [Vol. XXXVII
REIMAGINING THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
York.42 At the time of the trial, the law of seditious libel did not
require that the publication be false; rather, the law required the
jury to determine only whether the defendant made the
publication.43 Andrew Hamilton, arguing on behalf of Zenger,
admitted that his client published the material in question;
however, he successfully convinced the court to allow jurors to
render a general verdict.4 4 In his summation, Hamilton argued that
the jury should acquit Zenger because the publication was not
false, thus appealing to the jury's sense of duty:
[Y]our upright conduct, this day, will not only entitle you to the
love and esteem of your fellow citizens; but every man who
prefers freedom to a life of slavery will bless and honor you as
men who have baffled the attempt of tyranny; and by an
impartial and uncorrupt verdict, have laid a noble foundation for
securing to ourselves, our posterity, and our neighbors that to
which nature and the laws of our country have given us a
right,-the liberty-of both exposing and opposing arbitrary
power ... by speaking and writing truth.45
The jury acquitted Zenger, and accounts of the trial were
published and distributed throughout the colonies.4 6
The Zenger trial thus ushered in a new era in which England
struggled to retain control over increasingly hostile colonial juries.
Parliament used methods of control such as having the sheriff
select jurors who were biased in favor of the Crown and limiting a
defendant's ability to strike jurors on account of their political
42 See id. For more information about the Zenger trial, see generally Douglas 0.
Linder, John Peter Zenger Trial, FAMOUS AMERICAN TRIALS,
http://www.law.umkc.edulfaculty/projects/ftrials/zenger/zenger.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2012) (providing an account of the background and trial of John Peter Zenger).
43 Judge Lawrence W. Crispo, Jill M. Slansky & Geanene M. Yriarte, Jury
Nullification: Law Versus Anarchy, 31 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1997) (discussing the
trial and its impact on jury nullification).
44 William E. Nelson, The Lawfinding Power of Colonial American Juries, 71
OHIO ST. L.J. 1003, 1019 (2010).
45 JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 99 (1963).
46 JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 30 (1988); see, e.g., Linder, supra note
42.
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viewpoints.4 7 Massachusetts attempted to circumvent this practice
by enacting the Massachusetts Jury Selection Law, which
mandated that jury lists be compiled and vetted through town
meetings.48 Parliament responded by cancelling the law, once
again vesting sheriffs with plenary authority to select jurors.4 9
Another method of control was limiting the power of colonial
juries to hear particular types of cases.so After Parliament enacted
the Stamp Act of 1764, a statute that imposed a controversial tax
on paper, the English government transferred prosecutions under
the statute to the Admiralty courts, which did not allow jury
trials." In 1774, Parliament went even further by enacting the
Administration of Justice Act, which permitted English officials
charged with crimes in the colonies to face trial in England.52
Colonists indicted for treason could also face trial in England
instead of having the potential benefit of drawing a sympathetic
colonial jury.5 3
England's attempts to reign in the jury's power only
exacerbated the mounting dissidence among the colonists and
galvanized the struggle for political independence.54 Among the
grievances listed in the Declaration of Independence were
"depriving [the colonists] in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by
Jury" 5 and "transporting [colonists] beyond Seas to be tried for
pretended offences."56
B. The Founders' Conception of the Right to Trial by Jury
The implementation of the right to trial by jury has varied
considerably in the United States throughout its history, which
might lead one to wonder if there are any guiding principles to
47 HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 41, at 35.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 36.
50 GUINTHER, supra note 46, at 30.
51 Id
52 Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999
Wis. L. REv. 377, 394 (1999).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 395.
55 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
56 Id. para. 21.
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determine whether a particular feature is "essential" to the right.
Given that the U.S. Constitution recognized and firmly established
the right to trial by jury at the time of the Founding, guiding
principles may be gleaned from the Founders' conception of the
right-that is, from the roles that the Founders intended for the
right to fulfill in the country's democratic form of government."
The Founders envisioned the jury as an institution that fulfilled
three related roles: operating as a check against judicial and
governmental overreaching, allowing for meaningful citizen
participation in the democratic process, and acting as an essential
figure in the administration of justice."
As discussed in the preceding section, the tensions between the
colonists and the Crown were fueled in large part by the Crown's
use of the judicial system as a mechanism to establish its authority
over the colonists. It is no wonder then that the Founders
considered the jury to be the "bulwark against the unjust use of
governmental power." 9 Although there was some debate between
the Federalists and Anti-Federalists regarding the extent to which
civil juries fulfilled this role, there was consensus that criminal
juries were necessary for this purpose.6 0 In justifying the need for
jury trials in criminal cases, Alexander Hamilton highlighted the
dangers of "[a]rbitrary impeachments, arbitrary methods of
prosecuting pretended offenses, [and] arbitrary punishments upon
arbitrary convictions" that operated as "the great engines of
judicial despotism." 6' The Anti-Federalists sought even greater
protection for the right to trial by jury than the Federalists, arguing
that protection of the right should extend to civil cases as well.6 2
According to Federal Farmer IV, jurors act as the "centinels and
guardians" of free society. 63  Thomas Jefferson echoed this
57 See McClanahan, supra note 8, at 795.
58 Id. at 803.
59 Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J.
170, 172 (1964) [hereinafter Jury's Changing Role].
60 THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
61 Id.
62 See Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury:
Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REv. 441, 471-72 (1997)
(describing Anti-Federalist arguments against the exclusion of the right to trial by jury in
civil cases).
63 LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN IV (Oct. 12, 1778); see
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sentiment when he wrote: "I consider [trial by jury] as the only
anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be
held to the principles of its constitution." 64
In addition to the conception of the jury as a protector of the
people, the Founders envisioned the jury as an institution through
which citizens could participate in government.6 ' The Founders
believed that there were two primary benefits to allowing citizen
participation through jury service. First, the jury was seen as an
educational tool, teaching citizens about the government and their
rights and responsibilities.6 6  Alexis de Tocqueville, a French
citizen who traveled to America and studied the jury system, wrote
the most well-known descriptions of this benefit. 67 Tocqueville
referred to the jury as "a gratuitous public school" that "invests
each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes them all feel the
duties which they are bound to discharge towards society; and the
part which they take in the Government." 68
Second, the Founders conceived of the jury as one part of the
judicial branch, a type of "lower judicial bench" in a bicameral
judiciary.6 9 Viewed in this way, the judicial branch was similar in
structure to the legislative branch, which has "an upper house of
greater stability and experience and a lower house to represent
popular sentiment more directly."o John Adams recognized this
also AMAR, supra note 6, at 84 (discussing the importance of the right to trial by jury to
the Anti-Federalists).
64 3 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (H. A.
Washington ed. 1854); see also Thomas J. Methvin, Alabama-The Arbitration State, 62
THE ALABAMA LAWYER 48, 49 (2001) ("In 1774, John Adams stated: 'Representative
government and trial by jury are the heart and lungs of liberty. Without them, we have
no other fortification against being ridden like horses, fleeced like sheep, worked like
cattle, and fed and clothed like swine and hounds."').
65 AMAR, supra note 6, at 94-95.
66 Id. at 93.
67 See generally Phillip C. Kissam, Alexis de Tocqueville and American
Constitutional Law: On Democracy, The Majority Will, Individual Rights, Federalism,
Religion, Civic Associations, and Originalist Constitutional Theory, 59 ME. L. REV. 35
(2007) (describing de Tocqueville's theories in relation to modern constitutional law).
68 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 337 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Schoken Books 1961) (1835); see AMAR, supra note 6, at 93.
69 JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 209 (Yale Univ. Press 1950) (1814).
70 AMAR, supra note 6, at 95.
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similarity, writing that "the common people, should have as
complete a control, as decisive a negative, in every judgment of a
court of judicature" as they have in the legislature." Andrew
Hamilton likewise adopted this view during the Zenger trial; in his
summation to the jury, he described the disagreement between
judges regarding the law of seditious libel and asserted that the
jury had the power (and should be charged) to resolve the issue.72
These two benefits of jury service-the judiciary educating the
citizenry and the citizens in turn affecting judicial decision-
making-also demonstrate the symbiotic relationship that the
Founders envisioned between judges and jurors, with each
informing the other.
The right to trial by jury thus served to maintain the balance
between the government and its citizens, making it central to the
administration of justice." The importance of the right to trial by
jury to the Founders is evidenced not only by its inclusion in the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, but also by the contentious
exchanges between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists regarding
the inclusion of the right in those governing documents.7 4 Much
of the debate did not concern whether the right was significant
enough to be included, but rather how it could be included given
the lack of uniformity among the states in the way in which the
71 2 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 253 (1850). John
Adams was one of the most vigorous proponents of the jury's right to decide cases
contrary to the court. See, e.g., id, at 254-55 (I[S]hould the melancholy case arise that
the judges should give their opinions to the jury against one of these fundamental
constitutional principles, is a juror obliged to give his verdict generally, according to this
direction, or even to find the fact specially, and submit the law to the court? Every man,
of any feeling or conscience, will answer, no. It is not only his right, but his duty, in that
case, to find the verdict according to his own best understanding, judgment, and
conscience, though in direct opposition to the direction of the court.").
72 See Linder, supra note 42.
73 McClanahan, supra note 8, at 808; see AMAR, supra note 6, at 96-97 (positing
that the centrality of jury trials is evidenced by its inclusion in the Fifth, Sixth, and
Seventh Amendments, as well as by the limitations on the judiciary that are found in the
First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments).
74 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 60; LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL
FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN IV, supra note 63; see also Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of
How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J.
1005, 1009 (1992) (noting that the Anti-Federalists threatened to block ratification of the
Constitution because of its failure to include the right to trial by jury in civil cases).
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right was implemented in civil cases.7' Nevertheless, Alexander
Hamilton noted of the Federalists and Anti-Federalists: "[I]f they
agree in nothing else, [they]concur at least in the value they set
upon the trial by jury."7 6 The jury's impact also extended beyond
the judicial branch, "for however great its influence may be upon
the decisions of the courts, it is still greater on the destinies of
society at large."77  Therefore, the jury was viewed as an
institution having an immediate practical effect on the parties
before it, as well as a more far-reaching effect on the judicial
system and even the success of the nation as a democracy.
C. Jury Trials at the Time of the Founding and Today
Contrary to the Founders' conception of the right to trial by
jury, which had many universally shared aspects, the
implementation of the right varied among colonies and newly-
created states. This Part discusses several features of jury trials at
the time of the Founding and attempts to identify commonalities;
these historical trends will then be compared to trends in the
modem American jury system. The following features will be
explored: (1) the roles of the judge and jury in deciding issues of
law; (2) the division of labor between the judge and jury in
rendering verdicts and imposing punishments; and (3) a
defendant's right to waive trial by jury in criminal cases.
1. Roles ofJudge and Jury in Deciding Issues ofLaw
Judges in colonial America typically exercised less control
over trials than their contemporary counterparts, particularly as it
pertained to resolving issues of law for the jury." In Rhode
Island, for instance, judges assumed an administrative role,
holding office "not for the purpose of deciding causes, for the jury
decided all questions of law and fact; but merely to preserve order,
and see that the parties had a fair chance with the jury."79
75 Klein, supra note 74, at 1012-2 1.
76 THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 60.
77 DE ToCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 68, at 282.
78 See Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV.
582, 590-91 (1939) (explaining that judges in colonial America were typically laymen).
79 Id. at 591; see also Amasa M. Eaton, The Development of the Judicial System in
Rhode Island, 14 YALE L.J. 148, 153-54 (1905) (discussing the limited role ofjudges in
colonial Rhode Island).
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Moreover, judges in several colonies, including Rhode Island and
Massachusetts, did not routinely give jury instructions." Although
judges in Connecticut gave jury "instructions," these instructions
were generally limited to identifying the issues to be decided by
the jury."
In colonial Massachusetts, judges assumed an advisory role in
relation to juries' decisions on issues of law.82 Cases were tried
before at least three judges, each of whom informed the jury of the
judge's own interpretation of the law." Even if all judges agreed
on a single interpretation, however, attorneys could still argue
their own interpretation of the law to the jury.8 4 Thus, the jury
could disregard the judges' interpretations of the law and apply its
own interpretation-giving the jury the ultimate power over all
issues of law or fact before it."
The jury's role in determining issues of law continued
throughout the transition from colony to fledgling nation."
During the first seventy-five years of the nation's existence, at
least nine states granted juries the right to decide issues of law
through a constitutional or statutory provision, and the courts in
another six states recognized the existence of the right." The
Supreme Court of the United States itself recognized the jury's
right to decide issues of law when sitting as a trial court in the
1791 decision of Georgia v. Brailsford." Chief Justice John Jay,
80 Smith, supra note 21, at 441-42.
81 Id. at 441.
82 WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 3 (1975).
8 3 Id.
84 Id.
85 See Landsman, supra note 22, at 592-93; see also NELSON, supra note 82, at 28-
30 (discussing the nature of the law-finding power of colonial Massachusetts juries).
86 See Jury's Changing Role, supra note 59, at 171-72; Albert W. Alschuler &
Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI.
L. REv. 867, 906-11 (1994).
87 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 86, at 910; see also Richard E. Myers, 11,
Requiring a Jury Vote of Censure to Convict, 88 N.C. L. REv. 137, 158-59 (2009)
(stating that the "jury's right to decide questions of law in criminal cases was widely
accepted around the country from the time of the passage of the Constitution until the
middle of the 1800s").
88 Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794); see Jury's Changing Role, supra
note 59, at 173-74 (discussing the significance of the Brailsford decision).
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in his instructions to the jury, stated:
On this, and on every other occasion, however, we have no
doubt, you will pay that respect, which is due to the opinion of
the court: For, as on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are
the best judges of fact; it is, on the other hand, presumable, that
the courts are the best judges of law. But still both objects are
lawfully, within your power of decision. 89
Although the jury's right to decide issues of law was firmly
established at the time of the Founding, the right began to erode in
the mid-nineteenth century. 90 Even the Supreme Court reversed
course in Sparf v. United States,9 1 an 1895 decision. Justice
Harlan, in his majority opinion, espoused a circumscribed view of
the right, as well as the role of the jury more generally:
[I]t is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the
court and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from
the evidence . ... Under any other system, the courts, although
established in order to declare the law, would for every practical
purpose be eliminated from our system of government as
instrumentalities devised for the protection equally of society
and of individuals in their essential rights. When that occurs our
government will cease to be a government of laws, and become
a government of men. 92
Sparf drew a sharp distinction between the judge as law-
decider and the jury as fact-finder, and those distinctions became
even more pronounced during the next century." Only the
89 Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 4.
90 McClanahan, supra note 8, at 819-24 (documenting the erosion of the right
during the mid- to late-nineteenth century); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 86, at 909-11
(explaining the historical changes that indicated the right was diminishing).
91 156 U.S. 51 (1895); see Myers, supra note 87, at 157-58 (explaining the
dramatic shift in the Supreme Court's understanding of the right to trial by jury from the
Brailsford decision to the Sparf decision).
92 Sparf 156 U.S. at 102-03.
93 Smith, supra note 21, at 452-53. See generally JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE
JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 67-88 (1994) (summarizing
changes in jury functions following Spar).
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constitutions of three states still retain constitutional provisions
that ostensibly grant jurors the right to decide issues of law.9' The
courts in each of those states have interpreted the constitutional
provisions to render the right meaningless.95
2. Division ofLabor in Rendering Verdicts and
Imposing Punishment
Perhaps because of the historical context in which jury trials
rose to prominence in colonial America, criminal juries uniformly
have been given the authority to render general verdicts, with
relatively little influence or interference from judges except by
way of jury instructions.96 Furthermore, if a criminal jury returns
an acquittal, it may not be invalidated by the judge or appealed by
the prosecution.9 7
Although considerably less is known about the colonial jury's
role in determining sentencing, the colonial jury certainly had a
greater role in the process than its modem counterpart.9 8 This
sentencing role initially stemmed from the jury's right to decide
issues of law and to render general verdicts." Unlike modem
criminal codes, the criminal codes in the colonial and early
American periods "ma[de] death the exclusive and mandatory
sentence for . .. all persons convicted of any of a considerable
number of crimes, typically including at a minimum, murder,
treason, piracy, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, and sodomy."'oo
Jurors responded to the harshness of these provisions by refusing
94 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 86, at 911. The three states retaining such
provisions are Georgia, Indiana, and Maryland. Id.
95 Id.
96 See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 36 (2003) (discussing
American criminal juries' authority to render general verdicts and connecting such
authority to the Founding).
97 Id.
98 See Smith, supra note 21, at 454 (explaining the differences between the role of
a jury in colonial courts and modem courts).
99 See Chris Kemmitt, -Function Over Form: Reviving the Criminal Jury's
Historical Role as a Sentencing Body, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93, 103 (2006) (arguing
that the historical function of the jury was to provide guidance for sentencing).
100 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976); see also R. BYE, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 2-3 (1919).
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to convict defendants, even when they had actually committed the
conduct in question.'01 States responded by limiting the types of
capital offenses, 10 2 dividing murder into degrees,'03 and giving
juries discretion in determining whether a convicted defendant
should receive the death penalty.10 4 Thus, through its power to
render general verdicts, the jury functioned as a type of sentencing
body at the time of the Founding. o
Upon entering the Union, most states expanded the jury's
rudimentary sentencing power by including specific jury
sentencing provisions in their original criminal codes.'06 In the
nineteenth century, approximately half of the states allocated to
juries the responsibility of determining sentences in non-capital
cases, and several other states allowed juries to recommend
sentences in non-capital cases.o' Taken together, these statistics
indicate that few states exclusively relied upon judges to
determine sentences in non-capital cases.'
Over the course of the twentieth century, nearly every state
took away this responsibility from jurors and vested it in judges.'0 9
Only five states (Arkansas,' Missouri,"' Oklahoma," 2 Texas,113
and Virginial'4) still allow juries to render binding sentences in
101 HUGo ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 9-10 (3d ed. 1982).
102 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289.
103 BEDAU, supra note 101, at 10-11.
104 Id
105 See Kemmit, supra note 99, at 102-11 (describing the jury's role as one of
sentencing mitigation).
106 See Adriaan Lanni, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1791 (1999) (noting that there is a popular
misconception that American judges have always had the sole authority to determine
sentences in non-capital cases).
107 Morris B. Hoffnan, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 964
(2003).
108 Id.
109 See Lanni, supra note 106, at 1777 (noting the dramatic decrease in jury
sentencing from the 1970s onward).
I 10 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-103 (2011).
''' Mo. REv. STAT. § 557.036 (2011).
112 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 926.1, 927.1 (2011).
I13 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07(2)(b) (West 2011).
'14 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 (2011).
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non-capital felony cases,"' and several of those states include
further limitations on the jury's right to determine sentences.' 1 6
For example, in Missouri, a defendant may request, before voir
dire, that the judge determine the sentence if the defendant is
convicted."' In Kentucky, juries may make sentencing
recommendations in non-capital felony cases, but their decisions
are not binding upon judges."' In the federal court system, all
non-capital sentences are determined by judges."'
3. Defendant's Right to Waive Trial by Jury
During the eighteenth century, English courts did not give
criminal defendants a meaningful option to waive jury trials.'2 0
Prior to 1772, defendants who refused to consent to a jury trial
were tortured until they changed their minds; afterwards,
defendants who refused to consent to a jury trial were instead
deemed to have pled guilty to the charges against them.121
Colonial practice was somewhat more varied, with at least some
colonies permitting waivers of jury trials,12 2 but such waivers were
115 Hoffman, supra note 107, at 953 n.1.
116 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-103(b) (2011) (providing that the court
determines sentences where "(1) The defendant pleads guilty to an offense; (2) The
defendant's guilt is tried by the court; (3) The jury fails to agree on punishment; (4) The
prosecution and the defense agree that the court may fix punishment; or (5) A jury
sentence is found by the trial court or an appellate court to be in excess of the
punishment authorized by law").
117 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 557.036 (2011).
118 See Murphy v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W. 3d 173, 178 (Ky. 2001) (interpreting
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055(2) (2010) to permit juries to make sentencing
recommendations in non-capital cases).
119 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32. The jury has a limited role in sentencing in that "any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi v. United States,
530 U.S. 466, 466 (2000). A discussion of the impact of Apprendi is beyond the scope
of this Article. For more information on this issue, see generally Erwin Chemerinsky,
Making Sense ofApprendi and Its Progeny, 37 McGEORGE L. REV. 531 (2006).
120 Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397,
441 (2009); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 27 (1965).
121 Singer, 380 U.S. at 27.
122 See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930) (using the fact that jury
waivers were not "unknown" in the colonial period as evidence that jury trials could be
waived by the defendant).
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considered to be "isolated instances."1 23  Alexander Hamilton's
Federalist No. 83 further supports the proposition that jury trials
could not be waived by criminal defendants, in that it argues
against extending such a mandate to all civil trials.124
If anything, state courts were less apt than colonial courts to
allow criminal defendants to waive jury trials. 125  This practice
continued through the Supreme Court's 1898 decision in
Thompson v. Utah,126 in which it seemingly held that criminal
defendants could not waive jury trials.127  According to the
opinion, a criminal defendant could not "assent to be deprived of
his liberty by a tribunal not authorized by law to determine his
guilt."l 28 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that "[t]he
public has an interest in his life and liberty. Neither can be
lawfully taken except in the mode prescribed by law."l 29  In the
following decade, two circuit courts likewise held that criminal
defendants could not waive jury trials in federal trial courts.'3 0
Notwithstanding the decades of state and federal court
procedure to the contrary, the Supreme Court reversed course in
Patton v. United States,'"' in which it held that jury trials may be
123 Singer, 380 U.S. at 26; see Appleman, supra note 120, at 441 (noting that bench
trials were uncommon occurrences in early America).
124 THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 60.
125 Such states included Arkansas, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Ohio. See Singer, 380 U.S. at 32 n.6
(compiling state court decisions in which defendants were prohibited from waiving jury
trials).
126 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
127 Thompson, 170 U.S. at 353-55; see Jessica Powley Hayden, The Ties That Bind:
The Constitution, Structural Restraints, and Government Action Overseas, 96 GEO. L.J.
237, 265 (2007) (analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in Thompson).
128 Thompson, 170 U.S. at 354-55.
129 Id. at 354.
130 Low v. United States, 169 Fed. 86, 92 (6th Cir. 1909) ("Undoubtedly the accused
has a right to waive everything which pertains to form and much which is of the structure
of a trial. But he may not waive that which concerns both himself and the public, nor
any matter which involves fundamentally the jurisdiction of the court."); Dickinson v.
United States, 159 Fed. 801, 812 (1st Cir. 1908) ("[I]n accordance with the rules of the
common law, some things may be waived, as, for example, the qualification of a
particular juror or the right to a speedy trial, while it does not follow that, by analogy, a
waiver may extend to any part of the provisions of article 3 of the original Constitution
applicable hereto.").
131 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
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waived by criminal defendants.13 2 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court stated that trial by jury at the time of the Founding
"uniformly was regarded as a valuable privilege bestowed upon
the person accused of [a] crime for the purpose of safeguarding
him against the oppressive power of the King and the arbitrary or
partial judgment of the court."' On the other hand, the Court
found no evidence "that trial by jury was regarded as part of the
structure of government." 3 4 Later cases clarified that a defendant
does not have an absolute right to waive a jury trial, and a waiver
may be contingent upon prosecution consent or court approval."'
Nevertheless, nearly every jurisdiction currently allows criminal
defendants to waive jury trials. 36
Examining these features of jury trials at the time of the
Founding, a different picture of the jury begins to emerge. The
jury was an active participant in the administration of justice,
charged both with deciding issues of law and in imposing
sentences. Through these roles, juries worked alongside judges;
although both had their areas of expertise, juries could provide
input in other areas as well. Furthermore, the "right" to trial by
jury was not originally seen as one held within the discretion of
the accused, but rather as an integral part of the judicial system,
reflecting the role of citizens in that system.
132 Id. at 312-13; see also AMAR, supra note 6, at 108 (describing the Supreme
Court's reversal in Patton from its earlier precedent).
133 Patton, 281 U.S. at 296-97.
134 Id Akhil Amar strongly criticizes the Patton Court's characterization of the
right to trial by jury as solely for the benefit of the accused and argues that the court
misconstrued the language of Article III, Section 2 and the Sixth Amendment. See
AMAR, supra note 6, at 104-06; see also Jackie Gardina, Compromising Liberty: A
Structural Critique of the Sentencing Guidelines, 38 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 345, 374-82
(2005) (criticizing the reasoning of the Patton Court).
135 See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 27 (1965); see also FED. R. CRIM. P.
23(a) (providing such a restriction).
136 3 DAVID A. RUDSTEIN, C. PETER ERLINDER & DAVID C. THOMAS, CRIMINAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.06 (1992). Only two states, North Carolina and South
Carolina, completely prohibit criminal jury trial waivers. See State v. Hudson, 185
S.E.2d 189, 192 (N.C. 1971) (interpreting N.C. CONST. art.1, § 24 to prohibit waivers);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-80 (2011).
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III. Citizen Participation in the Japanese Criminal
Justice System
On May 21, 2004, the Japanese Diet enacted Saibin-in no
Sanka Suru Keifi Saiban ni Kansuru Horitsu ("Saiban-in Act"),'17
which created the saiban-in seido to decide particular categories of
criminal cases. The Saiban-in Act was the result of five years of
official debate and decades of informal exchanges between legal
scholars and professionals about the role of citizen participation in
the Japanese judicial system.' 8  This Part discusses Japan's
previous attempts at trial by jury and the circumstances of the late
twentieth century that prompted judicial reform. This Part also
examines the goals that Japanese reformists sought to achieve by
reintroducing citizen participation in the judicial system and
compares those goals to the Founders' conception of the right to
trial by jury.
A. Previous Attempts at Trial by Jury in Japan
The Japanese government attempted to introduce jury trials
twice prior to the enactment of the Saiban-in Act.13 9 The first
endeavor came in the 1870s during the Meiji Period, with the
introduction of the sanza system.140 Unlike other jury systems, the
137 See Saibin-in no Sanka Suru Keiji Saiban ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act Concerning
Participation of Lay Judges in Criminal Trials], Law No. 63 of 2004 (Japan) [hereinafter
Saiban-in Act]. The Saiban-in Act is translated in Kent Anderson & Emma Saint,
Japan's Quasi Jury (Saiban-in) Law: An Annotated Translation of the Act Concerning
Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L & POL'Y J. 223
(2005). The author also verified that the 2005 translation by Anderson & Saint was
substantively similar to a 2009 translation generously provided to the author by Professor
Anderson. See Saiban-in Act, translated in Kent Anderson, Saiban-in Act (Oct. 31,
2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
138 See Fukurai, Japan's Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems, supra note 1, at 802-
06 (discussing the official debate leading up to the enactment of the Saiban-in Act).
Beginning in the 1990s, legal scholars began calling for Japanese jury reform. See, e.g.,
Lester W. Kiss, Reviving The Criminal Jury in Japan, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 261
(1999); Richard Lempert, A Jury For Japan?, 40 AM. J. CoMP. L. 37 (1992); Daniel H.
Foote, From Japan's Death Row to Freedom, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 11 (1992).
139 There was a third attempt at trial by jury in Japan, but it came about as a result of
the Allied Occupation of mainland Japan and Okinawa following World War II. See
Anna Dobrovolskaia, Japan's Past Experiences With the Institution of Jury Service, 12
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 17-21 (2010) [hereinafter Dobrovolskaia, Japan's Past
Experiences].
140 Id. at 6-7 (citing TAKEKI OSATAKE, KEI BUNKA SHI TOSHITE No NIHON BAISHIN
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sanza system was a special jury created in response to a single
high-profile incident, a dispute involving both the Counselor and
Governor of the Kyoto Prefecture.141 It was a single panel,
devised for a single trial.142 The sanza panel was reprised two
years later, following the assassination of the Counselor of
State.143  Again, the panel was organized for a single trial.144
Notably, the sanza rules were developed independently for each
trial, and there were significant differences regarding the role of
the jury in both trials. In the first trial, the sanza panel was
empowered to determine the verdict only; in the second trial, the
jurors were charged "not only with the task of determining
whether the accused was guilty or not, but also with the
responsibility of evaluating the quality of pre-trial investigations
and even commenting on the appropriateness of the court's
,,141actions.
Because the sanza system was a special jury system, rather
than a systematic attempt to introduce citizen participation into the
judicial branch, it is difficult to ascertain the precise reasons why it
was not used after 1875.146 However, two insights can be gleaned
from Japan's first experiment with jury trials. First, the Japanese
government apparently recognized the value of citizen
participation in cases in which the government could be perceived
as having a strong bias towards one of the litigants. Second,
although the role of the initial sanza panel was similar to its
contemporary western counterparts in that it was limited to a fact-
finding function, the second sanza panel was envisioned as a more
central figure in the trial-going beyond the fact-finding function
SHI [THE HISTORY OF JURY IN JAPAN As [PART OF] THE MEIJI CULTURAL HISTORY] 10
(Hokodo Shoten 1926)).
141 Id. at 6.
142 Id. at 7-8.
143 Id. at 8.
144 Dobrovolskaia, Japan's Past Experiences, supra note 139, at 8.
145 Id.
146 In the years following the sanza trials, Emile Gustave Boissanade de Fontarabie,
a French scholar involved with judicial reform in Japan, recommended that the country
formally adopt a jury system. Although there was some support among Japanese
legislators, it did not become part of the Meiji Constitution. MERYLL DEAN, JAPANESE
LEGAL SYSTEM 96-99 (2d ed. 2002); see also Dobrovolskaia, Japan 's Past Experiences,
supra note 139, at 9-11 (discussing Boissonade's proposal).
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typically associated with American juries by the late 1800s.147
Japan's next attempt at trial by jury came almost fifty years
later, with the 1923 enactment of the Baishin Ho ("Jury Act"). 148
Unlike the earlier special juries, the introduction of the "pre-war"
jury system appears to be linked to the strong democratic
movement in Japan at the time.14 9  Although there was little
written prior to the enactment of the Jury Act about the driving
forces behind the introduction of trial by jury, the purposes of the
Act may be surmised from the Baishin Tebiki ("The Jury
Guidebook"), which was published in 1931.150 The Jury
Guidebook was one of several efforts geared towards educating
the Japanese citizenry about the workings of jury trials and
improving public reception of the pre-war jury system.s1 The
Jury Guidebook sets out the purpose of the Jury Act in the
following manner:
Until recently, the judiciary was the only branch of power that
did not allow for public participation, and justice was carried
about exclusively by professional judges.... More than forty
years have passed since the promulgation of the Constitution,
and the Japanese people have accumulated sufficient
experiences and have been prepared for participating in the
national administration. In addition, the realities of the world
have become more complex, and allowing for public
participation in certain trial proceedings is likely to result in an
even higher level of trust in the judicial system on the part of
ordinary citizens. It is also a good opportunity for people to
develop their knowledge and understanding of law, which, in
turn, should enable the operations of the court system to be
carried out smoothly.152
147 See supra Part I.C. 1.
148 Baishin Ho [The Jury Act], Law No. 50 of 1923 (Japan); see DEAN, supra note
146, at 100 (describing the introduction of The Jury Act).
149 See Kiss, supra note 138, at 267-68 (noting how the political climate affected the
Japanese jury system).
150 Anna Dobrovolskaia, The Jury System in Pre-War Japan: An Annotated
Translation of "The Jury Guidebook" (Baishin Tebiki), 9 ASIAN-PAc. L. & POL'Y J. 231,
237 (2008) [hereinafter Dobrovolskaia, The Jury System].
151 Id. at 240.
152 DAI NIPPON BAISHIN KYOKAI HENSHUBU [THE EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE
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Even taking into account the nature of this document, it is clear
that the Japanese government was hoping to achieve many of the
same benefits as those espoused by the American Founders.
Indeed, the pre-war jury system was modeled in large part after the
Anglo-Saxon jury system,15 3 as Japanese prosecutors traveled to
the United States and Europe to observe the workings of those jury
systems. 154 Not surprisingly, the pre-war jury system "was at first
welcomed as the palladium of liberty.""'
Although the pre-war jury system shared some similarities
with the American jury system of the early twentieth century,
including having the primary responsibility of fact-finder in
criminal trials,156 the two systems differed in several respects. The
pre-war jury was not permitted to render a general verdict, but
rather had to answer specific questions posed by the trial judge
regarding the facts comprising a crime.1' Furthermore, only a
majority of the twelve jurors needed to agree on an answer to a
fact-related question for the outcome to be binding on the
JAPAN JURY AssocIATION], BAISHIN TEBIKI: HOTEI SAN'YO NISSHI TSUKI [THE JURY
GUIDEBOOK: INCLUDES JOURNAL OF TRIAL PARTICIPATION] (DAi NIPPON BAISHIN KYOKAi
1931) [hereinafter THE JAPAN JURY ASSOCIATION], reprinted in BAISHIN TEBIKI: HOTEl
SAN'Yo NISSHI TSUKI [THE JURY GUIDEBOOK: INCLUDES JOURNAL OF TRIAL
PARTICIPATION] (Satoru Shinomiya ed., Gendaijinbun-sha 1999), translated in
Dobrovolskaia, The Jury System, supra note 150, at 244-81.
153 DEAN, supra note 146, at 100. There is some debate regarding whether the pre-
war jury system was modeled primarily after the contemporary Anglo-Saxon jury system
or the contemporary German jury system. Compare id., with A.C. Oppler, Legal Reform
in Occupied Japan-A Participant Looks Back, reprinted in MERYLL DEAN, JAPANESE
LEGAL SYSTEM: TEXT AND MATERIALS 144-45 (1997) ("A petty jury system, patterned...
on the German model, existed in Japan from 1923-1943.... Actually, the Japanese jury
system was even a watered-down edition of the German."). Nevertheless, the greater
weight of authority concludes that the Japanese jury system was modeled after the
Anglo-Saxon system. E.g., Lempert, supra note 138, at 37.
154 Dobrovolskaia, The Jury System, supra note 150, at 253; see also Kiss, supra
note 138, at 266 (noting that the Japanese examined the trial systems of the United
States, England, France, and Germany).
155 DEAN, supra note 146, at 100.
156 See Levin, supra note 11, at 203.
157 Mamoru Urabe, Wagakuni Ni Okeru Bashin Saiban No Keneku [A Study on Trial
by Jury In Japan] (1968), reprinted in HIDEO TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM:
INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATERIALS 484 (1976).
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defendant.'5 ' The types of cases subject to jury trials were limited
to particular categories of serious crimes,'5 ' and jury service was
limited to literate males who had attained thirty years of age and
had satisfied residence and tax-paying requirements.'6 0
The most dramatic differences between the two systems,
however, pertained to the effect of decisions made by the pre-war
jury. In one respect, a decision of the pre-war jury as to the
existence of a fact was conclusive; if the decision was accepted by
the trial court, no koso appeal (appeal on issues of fact) was
permitted."' Nevertheless, a court was not obligated to accept a
decision by the pre-war jury; rather, "upon finding the jury's
answer unwarranted," it could dismiss the jury and submit the case
to another jury.'6 2 Apparently there was no limit to the number of
times a court could refuse to accept the decisions of jury panels.163
Even though the Jury Act was enacted in 1923, the first jury
trials did not commence until 1928.164 The initial response, as
measured by the number of jury trials, was promising: 143 jury
trials were held in 1929.165 The next year, the number of jury trials
declined to sixty-six, and by 1942, that number plummeted to
two. 166 The Jury Act was suspended in 1943,167 and it was never
158 Id
159 See id. In cases carrying possible sentences of death or life imprisonment, trial
by jury would be granted unless waived by the defendant. Id. In cases in which the
minimum sentence was at least one year imprisonment and the maximum sentence was
in excess of three years, a defendant could petition to have his case tried by a jury. Id.
Notably, several categories of crimes were expressly prohibited from being heard by
juries, including: "crimes against a member of the Imperial Family, riot with the purpose
of overthrowing the government, violation of the Chian Iji Ho ("Peace Preservation
Act"), espionage, and violation of laws concerning the election of public officials." Id
160 Id; see also Joseph J. Kodner, Re-Introducing Lay Participation to Japanese
Criminal Cases: An Awkward Yet Necessary Step, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STuD. L. REV.
231, 234-36 (2003) (discussing some of the defects in the pre-war jury system).
161 DEAN, supra note 146, at 100.
162 Urabe, supra note 157, at 484; accord Kodner, supra note 160, at 235.
163 See DEAN, supra note 146, at 100.
164 Lempert, supra note 138, at 37.
165 Urabe, supra note 157, at 485.
166 Id
167 Baishin Ho no Teishi Ni Kansuru Horitsu [An Act to Suspend the Jury Act],
Law No. 88 of 1943 (Japan).
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reinstated. 16 8
The demise of the pre-war jury system has been the subject of
much scholarly discussion.169 A complete treatment of the
possible contributing factors is beyond the scope of this Article,170
but several of the most prominent ones are identified and explored
below.
First, the pre-war jury system was not structured to optimally
achieve its foremost goal of increasing citizen participation in the
democratic process. The Jury Act provided for jury trials only in a
small number of serious criminal cases, thereby decreasing the
opportunities for citizens to serve on juries.'' The qualifications
for jury service-reminiscent of those in early America-further
reduced the likelihood that citizens would be exposed to jury
service.17 The publication of The Jury Guidebook, three years
after the first jury trial, illustrates the limited awareness of the pre-
war jury system at the time. 7 1
Second, the Japanese political and social climate shifted
dramatically from the enactment of the Jury Act in 1923 until its
suspension in 1943.14 Whereas the jury system was conceived
during a time of political liberalism and democratization, that
environment shifted in the 1930s to one of militarism and
autocracy."' Thus, even without the structural barriers to
widespread citizen participation, it is arguable that the participants
168 See Kent Anderson & Mark Nolan, Lay Participation in the Japanese Justice
System: A Few Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Lay Assessor System (saiban-in
seido) from Domestic Historical and International Psychological Perspectives, 37
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 935, 962 (2004) (explaining the history of the jury system in
Japan).
169 E.g., DAVID T. JOHNSON, JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN
JAPAN 42 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001); Stephan Landsman & Jing Zhang, A Tale Of Two
Juries: Lay Participation Comes to Japanese and Chinese Courts, 25 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 179, 182 (2008); Anderson & Nolan, supra note 168, at 963-64.
170 To read about the perspectives of several Japanese legal scholars, see generally
Urabe, supra note 157, at 485-91. See also Kodner, supra note 160, at 234-36
(identifying prominent theories).
171 See Dobrovolskaia, Japan's Past Experiences, supra note 139, at 13-14.
172 Anderson & Nolan, supra note 168, at 964.
173 Dobrovolskaia, The Jury System, supra note 150, at 240.
174 See Lempert, supra note 138, at 38 (connecting the suspension of the Jury Act to
World War II).
175 Id
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in the system, including the litigants, would be less apt to use such
a democratic system.
Third, in instituting the pre-war jury system, the Japanese
government focused primarily on creating an avenue for citizen
participation-rather than on creating a system whereby the jury
would function as a key figure in the administration of justice or
operate as a check on governmental overreaching. The Ministry
of Justice and local bar associations engaged in widespread
promotional efforts in the five-year period between the enactment
of the Jury Act and the first jury trial, trying to prepare Japanese
citizens for the prospect of participation in the judicial branch.'
Nevertheless, the limited fact-finding role of pre-war juries and the
non-binding nature of their decisions rendered their participation
little more than a rubber stamp on the judiciary."' Indeed, the
court's ability to disregard the decision of a jury panel or,
alternatively, to accept the decision and thereby foreclose the
defendant's opportunity for a koso appeal, is one of the most
commonly cited reasons for the small percentage of cases tried
under the pre-war jury system."'
Not only was the jury's role in criminal cases clearly
subservient to that of the judge, but jury participation was also
disallowed in the very types of cases in which arguably it would
be most important.' Among the types of cases that could not be
176 See Dobrovolskaia, The Jury System, supra note 150,.at 233-37. An editorial
published at the time of the enactment of the Jury Act stated that it "signaled the
'fulfillment of the hopes of the people' and that it represented 'the most important reform
in the history of [efforts aimed at] protecting human rights' in Japan." Id. at 235
(quoting Baishin Hoan No Tsuka 0 Shukusu [Celebrating the Passage of the Jury Act
Bill] Horitsu Shinbun, Mar. 28, 1943, at 3).
177 DEAN, supra note 146, at 100; Urabe, supra note 157, at 486 (describing that
defendants routinely waived jury trials because of the inability to appeal issues of fact,
once accepted).
178 See, e.g., Urabe, supra note 157, at 485-91 (collecting the views of Japanese
legal scholars on the demise of the pre-war jury system; many of the scholars cited the
non-binding nature of jury decisions and/or the lack of koso appeal); Kiss, supra note
138, at 268.
179 See Urabe, supra note 157, at 486 ("Professor Fumio Aoyagi . . . offers the
following opinion [regarding the demise of the jury system]: The Jury Act . . . provided
that no crime of political nature was to be tried by jury."); see also Kiss, supra note 138,
at 270 (postulating that the contemporaneous rise of fascism and lack of jury-trial
availability for individuals charged with political crimes was a factor in the failure of the
Japanese jury system).
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tried by a jury were "crimes against a member of the Imperial
Family, riot with the purpose of overthrowing the government,
violation of the Chian Iji H5 ("Peace Preservation Act"),
espionage, and violation of laws concerning the election of public
officials."' Ironically, these same types of cases-high-profile
cases involving the government-precipitated Japan's first
attempts at trial by jury during the Meiji period.'8 ' Thus, although
there was discussion that the jury system would "contribute to the
impartiality of justice,"'8 2 that goal was not borne out in the jury
system actually introduced and, over the course of fifteen years,
disregarded.
B. Laying the Groundwork for Citizen Participation
Because the pre-war jury system was suspended in connection
with World War II, many thought that jury trials would be
expeditiously revived at its conclusion.' That was not the case.184
In the meantime, Japanese judges had acquired a reputation as
"honest, esteemed, politically independent, and professionally
competent."' 85 Beginning in the early 1980s, however, criticism of
180 Urabe, supra note 157, at 484; accord Dobrovolskaia, Japan's Past Experiences,
supra note 139, at 13-14.
181 See Dobrovolskaia, Japan's Past Experiences, supra note 139, at 6-9.
182 Id. at 12 (referencing a 1910 proposal passed by the House of Representatives
supporting the introduction of a jury system in Japan). Unsurprisingly, The Jury
Guidebook does not focus on the impropriety or perceived impropriety of the judiciary as
a reason for instituting a jury system in Japan. The Jury Guidebook, supra note 152, at
249 ("The reasons behind the introduction of jury trials in [Japan] are fundamentally
different from those that triggered the implementation of the system in other countries.
In Japan, the citizens did not demand that this system be introduced and did not suffer
from the trial system that preceded it. The scrupulous fairness of Japanese courts was
unrivaled in the word and was exceptional in that it was trusted by the citizens
unreservedly. The reasons for introducing the jury system lie in the essence of the
constitutional state.").
183 See Dimitri Vanoverbeke, The Taisho Jury System: A Didactic Experience, 43
Soc. SCl. JAPAN 23, 26 (Sept. 2010) (discussing the didactic effects of the pre-war jury
system).
184 See id. ("[O]nly in the 1990s, in the wake of larger judicial reforms, did the
policy proposals on lay participation in the criminal justice system catch fire.").
185 Matthew Wilson, The Dawn of Criminal Jury Trials in Japan: Success On The
Horizon, 24 Wis. INT'L L. J. 835, 837 (2007) [hereinafter Wilson, The Dawn of Criminal
Jury Trials in Japan]; accord Landsman & Zhang, supra note 169, at 183 (noting the
high skill level, extreme selectivity, and incorruptible reputation of the Japanese
judiciary).
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the Japanese judicial system began to mount.186 Within six years,
four death row inmates were retried and acquitted of their
offenses.1 7 The exonerated inmates had spent a combined total of
over 130 years in prison on account of their convictions.'
Moreover, the cases were remarkably similar; in each, the suspect
had confessed to the murder only after a lengthy-and at times
severe-interrogation.18 9 Although the suspects withdrew their
confessions, they were convicted in trials that were dominated by
the prosecution.19 0  These cases turned the public's attention
squarely towards mechanisms designed to restrict the power of
prosecutors and ensure the propriety of all government actors in
the criminal justice system."9
Around the same time that the first of the wrongful convictions
came to light, the Baishin Saiban o Kangaeru Kai, ("Research
Group on Jury Trial" or "RGJT") was established as the first
grassroots organization committed to the reintroduction of jury
trials in Japan.'9 2 Several RGJT members had been involved in the
celebrated wrongful conviction cases.19 The organization held
186 See Robert M. Bloom, Jury Trials in Japan, 28 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV.
35, 47 (2006).
187 Id. See generally Foote, supra note 138 (describing each of the cases, drawing
comparisons between them, and discussing the ramifications on judicial reform in
Japan).
188 Bloom, supra note 186, at 47.
189 See Foote, supra note 138, at 65.
190 See id at 66; see also Hiroshi Fukurai, People's Panels vs. Imperial Hegemony:
Japan's Twin Lay Justice Systems and the Future ofAmerican Military Bases in Japan,
12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 95, 106 (2010) [hereinafter Fukurai, People's Panels vs.
Imperial Hegemony] (noting that there are few checks on the power of prosecutors in
criminal trials).
191 See Landsman & Zhang, supra note 169, at 187-88.
192 See Hiroshi Fukurai, The Rebirth of Japan's Petit Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury
Systems: A Cross-National Analysis of Legal Consciousness and the Lay Participatory
Experience in Japan and the US., 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 315, 317-21 (2007)
[hereinafter Fukurai, The Rebirth of Japan's Petit Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems]
(discussing the creation and influence of the Research Group on Jury Trial [hereinafter
RGJT]); see also Ingram Weber, The New Japanese Jury System: Empowering the
Public, Preserving Continental Justice, 4 E. ASIA L. REv. 125, 149 (2009) (explaining
the connection between the wrongful convictions and the emergence of citizen groups
focused on reintroducing a jury system).
193 See Fukurai, The Rebirth of Japan's Petit Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems,
supra note 192, at 318.
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public forums throughout the country to "talk about the
importance of civic participation in legal institutions" and "assess
positive effects of creating civic oversight of the judiciary and
prosecutions."' 9 4 Among the individuals associated with the group
was the former Chief Justice of the Japanese Supreme Court,
Koichi Yaguchi;'9 5 he later initiated a government study in 1989
regarding the introduction of a citizen jury system in Japan, and
''sent Japanese jurists" to the United States and several European
countries to observe the workings of the systems."' The Japanese
Federation of Bar Associations ("JFBA") likewise began
advocating for the introduction of citizen participation in criminal
trials to act as a check on the judicial system.'97
While the high-profile nature of the four wrongful convictions
galvanized the calls for reform,198 the efforts were also fueled by
the increasingly negative perception of the judiciary as a whole.
In part, the negative perception of the judiciary flows from the
structure of the system. In order to become a judge, candidates
must pass a rigorous examination after college graduation and
engage in two years of training.' They then become "career"
judges, being stationed for two- or three-year assignments around
the country.20 0 The assignments are made by the Secretariat of the
Japanese Supreme Court.20 ' This fact, together with the relative
194 Fukurai, Japan's Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems, supra note 1, at 803.
195 Fukurai, The Rebirth ofJapan's Petit Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems, supra
note 192, at 319.
196 Fukurai, Japan's Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems, supra note 1, at 803-04.
197 See Fukurai, The Rebirth of Japan's Petit Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems,
supra note 192, at 106,
198 Other legal scandals in the 1990s contributed to the deterioration in the public
perception of lawyers and judges. See Kodner, supra note 160, at 238 & n. 57 (providing
several examples of lawyer and judicial impropriety that were covered in Japanese
newspapers). See also id. at 233 (quoting a Feb. 14, 2001 editorial in the Mainchi Daily
entitled Judicial Corruption describing one such incident: "The rule of law here is
threatened by a major scandal. No matter how low standards and morals were to fall, we
had always believed that we could continue to place our trust in prosecutors and judges.
But officers of the court have betrayed this trust by attempting to cover up the
investigation of one of their own.").
199 See Bloom, supra note 186, at 47; Kiss, supra note 138, at 265.
200 See Landsman & Zhang, supra note 169, at 183.
201 Id; see also Weber, supra note 192, at 140 (describing the Supreme Court's
appointment power in detail).
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youth of judges at the time of their initial appointments, has led
many to claim that Japanese judges are out of touch with society
and pressured to reach outcomes that are favorable to the
government that bestowed their positions upon them.202 Annual
conviction rates in the late 1980s exceeded 99.8%, providing
further support for this claim.203
In 1989, as RGJT and other public and private entities began to
gain traction with their calls for citizen participation in the judicial
system, Japan suffered an economic collapse.204 The collapse had
profound effects: first, it triggered massive government
deregulation; and second, it prompted reforms to increase the
country's competiveness in the global economy.205 These reforms
were far reaching and included changing the corporate governance
system, improving the educational system, and increasing
government transparency.20 6 The judicial system likewise came
under scrutiny at this time because of its inefficiency and lack of
transparency. 207 The Liberal Democratic Party, with input from
several organizations, published reports in 1997 and 1998
advocating sweeping reforms of the legal profession and judiciary,
including an examination of citizen participation in legal
matters.208
202 See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 186, at 48-49; Weber, supra note 192, at 141
("[T]he Japanese judiciary provides career judges with little incentive, let alone
opportunity, to act on individual initiative and remains a conformist institution tightly
regulated by the General Secretariat."); see also Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg,
Judicial Audiences and Reputation: Perspective from Comparative Law, 47 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 451, 486-87 (2009) (presenting arguments on both sides of the issue of
whether the Japanese judiciary is truly independent).
203 Bloom, supra note 186, at 47; see also Foote, supra note 138, at 83 ("After
reaching a low of 0.10% in 1988, the acquittal rate nearly doubled in 1989 (albeit to a
still miniscule 0.19%).").
204 Senger, supra note 11, at 745; Arne Soldwedel, Testing Japan's Convictions:
The Lay Judge System and the Rights of Criminal Defendants, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1417, 1419 (2008) (describing the dire economic situation and the need for reform).
205 See Wilson, The Dawn of Criminal Jury Trials in Japan, supra note 185, at 841-
42; see also Weber, supra note 192, at 149-150.
206 See Wilson, The Dawn of Criminal Jury Trials in Japan, supra note 185, at 841-
42; see also Mark Levin & Virginia Tice, Japan's New Citizen Judges: How Secrecy
Imperils Judicial Reform, 60 ASIA-PAC. J. 91 (May 9, 2009).
207 See Wilson, The Dawn of Criminal Jury Trials in Japan, supra note 185, at 843;
Landsman & Zhang, supra note 169, at 186-87.
208 See Fukurai, People's Panels vs. Imperial Hegemony, supra note 190, at 106-07.
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On July 9, 1999, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi established the
Shiho Seido Kaikaku Shingikai ("Justice System Reform Council"
or "JSRC"). 2 09 According to the legislation that created the JSRC
("JSRC Act"), its task was to "consider fundamental measures
necessary for judicial reform and judicial infrastructure
management by defining the role of the Japanese administration of
justice in the 21st century."2 10  To that end, "[t]he agenda of the
[JSRC] may include the realization of a more accessible and user-
friendly judicial system, public participation in the judicial system,
redefinition of the legal profession and enforcement of its
function." 2 1 1  The JSRC was composed of thirteen members
representing a variety of professions and callings, including three
attorneys, two law school professors, three university
administrators, two businesspersons, a popular author, and the
president of the Japan Housewives Association.212
Five months after the JSRC was established, it published "The
Points at Issue in the Judicial Reform." 213  This document
describes the reasons behind and goals for judicial reform, as
conceived by the group charged with providing recommendations
for reforming the judicial system.2 14 In laying out the goals for
judicial reform, the JSRC stressed the importance of citizen
participation to the health and prosperity of the country:
209 Shiho Seido Kaikaku Shingikai Secchiho [Law Concerning Establishment of
Justice System Reform Council], Law No. 68 of 1999 (Japan) [hereinafter JSRC Act];
see also Matthew J. Wilson, Failed Attempt to Undermine the Third Wave: Attorney Fee
Shifting Movement in Japan, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1457, 1459-61 (2005) [hereinafter
Wilson, Failed Attempt to Undermine the Third Wave] (discussing the creation of the
JSRC and its reform efforts).
210 JSRC Act, art. 2; see also JUDICIAL REFORM COUNCIL, THE POINTS AT ISSUE IN
THE JUDICIAL REFORM 1.1 (Dec. 21, 1999) [hereinafter POINTS AT ISSUE], available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/0620reform.html (explaining reasons for the
creation of the JSRC).
211 POINTS AT ISSUE, supra note 210, at 1.1 (quoting JSRC Act, art. 2).
212 See Fukurai, People's Panels vs. Imperial Hegemony, supra note 190, at 321
(discussing the composition of the JSRC). The JSRC Act also indicated that "efforts
shall be made so that the actual condition of the judicial system is fully grasped and that
the voice of people of every class in Japan shall be fully reflected." POINTS AT ISSUE,
supra note 210, at 1.1 (quoting JSRC Act, para. 2, Supplementary Resolution of the
Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives).
213 POINTS AT ISSUE, supra note 210.
214 See id.
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Faced with a sense of crisis, plans of economic structure reform
such as political reform, administrative reform, promotion and
deregulation have been made and are being implemented in
order to recover creativity and vitality in this country. These
reforms hold in common the recognition that the basis required
to sustain the development of this nation in the 21st century is
that every person shall grow out of the sense of being a
governed object and shall participate in making a free and fair
society in mutual cooperation as an autonomous governing
subject with social responsibility in hand. This judicial reform
is one last pivot to achieve such [a] goal.215
Nevertheless, the need for judicial reform was not linked
solely to participation in the democratic process. Among the goals
for judicial reform was to "exclude the remaining practices of
arbitrary decision making and restrictions."2 16 Indeed, the
document acknowledged that a common complaint of the current
system was its "fail[ure] to exercise the check-function against
[the] administration." 21 7 The JSRC envisioned the judicial system
as "play[ing] a crucial role" in "keeping a watch of activities of the
political sector . .. in order to avoid unfair infringement of the
people's fundamental human rights."2 18 While the JSRC
emphasized the importance of citizen participation in the judicial
system, initially it did not take a position about the precise form
such participation should take, noting that it would debate "the
propriety of introduction of jury trials/lay-judge system which are
adopted in Europe and the United States of America, by paying
attention to their historical/cultural backgrounds and
institutional/practical conditions."2 19
Although the circumstances in colonial America differed in
many respects from those in late twentieth-century Japan, several
parallels can be drawn between the two as it relates to the push for
citizen participation in the judicial system. First, there were
215 Id. at 11.2.
216 Id. at Il.
217 Id. at III.1.
218 PoINTs AT ISSUE, supra note 210, at 11.2.
219 Id. at 111.2(4).
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famous trials-Zenger in America, the wrongful conviction cases
in Japan-in which the authority of the judiciary was publicly
questioned, causing citizens to closely scrutinize the respective
systems.2 20 Second, judges were perceived as being out of touch
with the citizenry and unduly influenced by other forces within the
government.2 21 Third, the push for judicial reform initially
stemmed from private action rather than being derived from the
government.2 2 2 Finally, judicial reform was part of a democratic
transformation that was taking place on a much larger scale.223
These similarities likewise shaped each country's conception of
the roles that juries or other citizen participation systems should
have in their society.
By the same token, the circumstances in Japan differed in
significant ways from the other periods in which the country had
experimented with trial by jury, and these differences help to
explain why the earlier systems were not sustainable.2 24 Although
the sanza system was used in two high-profile cases to ensure that
the government did not unduly influence the verdicts, the sanza
220 See Fukurai, People's Panels vs. Imperial Hegemony, supra note 190, at 319
(discussing four controversial death penalty cases in Japan in which the convicted
individuals were later exonerated); see also Nelson, supra note 44, at 1018-20
(examining the background and implications of the not-guilty verdict in the Zenger
case).
221 See, e.g., Landsman & Zhang, supra note 169, at 180 (noting that judicial reform
is being "driven by concerns about public disenchantment with an elite judicial corps
viewed as out of touch with ordinary life"); Fukurai, People's Panels vs. Imperial
Hegemony, supra note 190, at 105 ("[B]oth prosecutors and judges remain as an
exclusive class of elite bureaucrats within the Japanese government."); Bloom, supra
note 186, at 47-48 (noting that Japanese judges "seem to be an elitist, homogeneous
group with limited life experience").
222 See, e.g., Landsman & Zhang, supra note 169, at 186 (implying that criticism of
the press and politicians led to adoption of judicial reform measures); see also Kodner,
supra note 160, at 233 (noting that "[t]he Reform Council's radical departure from the
status quo was motivated, in part, by the perceived deterioration of public support for the
Japanese legal system").
223 See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 186, at 49 (stating that "the major reason for the
introduction of juries seems to be the idea of greater citizen participation in the running
of the government"); see also Wilson, The Dawn of Criminal Jury Trials in Japan, supra
note 185, at 41-42 (observing that what began as governmental response to an economic
slowdown in the 1980s "evolved into wholesale reevaluation of Japan's political and
economic structure").
224 See Sato lwao, Emergence of Citizen Participation in Trials in Japan:
Background and Issues, 43 Soc. Sa. JAPAN 3, 5 (Sept. 2010).
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system was not created to promote democratic principles. 225 Thus,
there was no impetus to allow for broad citizen participation or to
use the jury system to educate citizens about the judicial or
political systems. Conversely, the pre-war jury system was a
politician-led initiative with the sole purpose of promoting
democracy.226 In fact, The Jury Guidebook states that "[t]he
scrupulous fairness of the Japanese courts .. .was exceptional in
that it was trusted by the citizens unreservedly."2 27 Given this
sentiment, it is no surprise that the pre-war jury system was not
structured to provide an effective check on the government or to
give jurors meaningful participation in the judicial system.
Nevertheless, there is one striking difference between the
circumstances leading to judicial reform in the two countries:
whereas the Japanese government eventually itself pushed for
increased citizen participation in the judiciary, citizen participation
in colonial courts was viewed as a type of popular rebellion
against the English government.22 8 Some scholars have cited the
differences between the sources of power underlying the two
systems-government legislation in the case of Japan, the
Founding documents in the case of the United States-in claiming
that the saiban-in seido would, ultimately, not fully promote
democracy in Japan.22 9 However, such an argument is wrongly
premised on the idea that the Japanese government historically
sought to preserve the centralization of power, and thus its judicial
reforms would be similarly tailored in this instance.23 0 While that
225 See Dobrovolskaia, Japan's Past Experiences, supra note 139, at 6-9 (describing
the introduction and limited use of the sanza system).
226 See Dobrovolskaia, The Jury System, supra note 150, at 242 (noting that the
advocates for the pre-war jury system were "associated with the democratization
movement, which aimed to establish a court system that would serve the interests of the
people").
227 Id. at 248.
228 See Levin, supra note 11, at 207-11 (contrasting the origins of the jury trial in
Japan and America).
229 See, e.g., id at 211 (observing that aspects of the Saiban-in Act "may undermine
its stated goal of promoting democracy").
230 See id at 207. Levin correctly notes that the Meiji Constitution was created
under the premise that the government was the ultimate source of power. Id. at 207-08.
The Jury Guidebook reflects a similar attitude during the time of the pre-war jury system.
Dobrovolskaia, The Jury System, supra note 150, at 249 ("The Japanese Empire is
graciously ruled by the line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal, and the supreme
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might have been true with both of the previous experiments with
trial by jury, such was not the case in the events leading up to the
enactment of the JSRC Act. In the 1990s, Japan found itself in a
dire economic situation in which it believed that the only way it
would be able to sustain itself-much less compete globally-was
through massive decentralization of power.2 3' Furthermore, it saw
judicial system reform, including increased citizen participation,
as vital to achieving this goal.232 Thus, even though the Japanese
government did promote judicial reform, it did so for the purpose
of decentralizing the government.
IV. Adoption and Implementation of the Saiban-in
Seido
Given the similarities in the circumstances leading to judicial
reform in early America and late twentieth-century Japan, as well
as the common goals sought in increasing citizen participation in
the judiciary, one might expect that Japan would have adopted a
jury system similar to that of the United States. Although the
JSRC Act did not suggest that the American system would
eventually be adopted, nearly all of the discussions leading up to
its passage focused on the implications of adopting that type of
system.23 3 This Part describes the JSRC deliberations that led to
its recommendation of the saiban-in seido, a system which differs
from both the American jury system and the mixed-court tribunals
that are prevalent throughout Europe. This Part also discusses the
workings of the Saiban-in Act in greater detail and assesses its
initial impact on the judicial system and the Japanese people.
power in the Empire lies with the Emperor alone, which is something that does not
require any additional explanation."). However, such an attitude is notably absent from
the discussions regarding judicial reform in the late twentieth century.
231 See generally Gerald Paul McAlinn, Does Law Matter in Japan? The Emerging
Role of Law, Lawyers, and Legal Institutions in the Revitalization of Japan, 2 JINDAL
GLOBAL L. REv. 15 (2011) (describing the economic collapse and its effect on
decentralization and legal reform).
232 See POINTS AT ISSUE, supra note 210, at 111.2(4) ("It is also anticipated that
independence and participation of residents in local affairs shall further increase its
importance following decentralization of power. In such conditions where involvement
of the people as the sovereign is going to expand in many ways, we must also study the
ideal way of participation of the people in the judicial field as the sovereign.").
233 See Katsuta, supra note 10, at 506-11 (discussing the study of the American jury
system in Japan beginning in the 1980s).
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A. Justice System Reform Council Deliberations and
Recommendations
Between July 27, 1999 and June 12, 2001, the JSRC held
sixty-three meetings, at least six of which concerned citizen
participation.2 34 In addition, JSRC members traveled to the United
States, Germany, France, and England in April and May 2000 to
meet with lawyers and judges in order to gain a better
understanding of the judicial systems in those countries.23 5 Takuya
Katsuta, a Japanese scholar who has extensively studied the
American jury system and its influence on Japan,236 noted that
although the members conducted these trips and presented their
findings to the JSRC, the American jury system was the only one
discussed in any detail during JSRC meetings.2 37 Thus, this
section focuses on the reasons for the JSRC's rejection of the
American jury system, rather than its reasons for not adopting the
jury systems of other countries.
Because the JSRC meetings included testimony from legal
professionals and academics with varying views on the role of
citizen participation in the administration of justice, it is difficult
to determine which criticisms of the American jury system
actually resonated with the council members. Nonetheless, the
criticisms can be grouped into two general categories. The first
category concerned the functioning of the contemporary American
jury.238 Many of these criticisms came from members of the
Japanese Supreme Court who suggested that American juries
returned a high number of erroneous verdicts and, even more
234 Id. at 513. The JSRC deliberations were made available online to the public.
Meeting minutes, meeting summaries, and meetings handouts may be accessed at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/.
235 See Katsuta, supra note 10, at 522.
236 See generally Takuya Katsuta, Amerika Baishin Sei ni tsuiteno Ichi Kosatsu:
Saiban-in Seido no Donyu wo Megutte [A Study on Our Understanding of the American
Jury and Its Influence on the Judicial Reform in Japan], pt. 1, 54 HOGAKU ZASSHI J. L. &
POL. OSAKA CITY U. 1743 (2008), Takuya Katsuta, Amerika Baishin Sei ni tsuiteno Ichi
Kosatsu: Saiban-in Seido no Donyu wo Megutte [A Study on Our Understanding of the
American Jury and Its Influence on the Judicial Reform in Japan], pt. 2, 55 HOGAKU
ZASSHI J. L. & POL. OSAKA CITY U. 633 (2008).
237 See Katsuta, supra note 10, at 522-23. JSRC members submitted reports of their
impressions during the 19th meeting. See JSRC, 19th Meeting Minutes (May 16, 2000),
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai19/19gijiroku.html.
238 See Katsuta, supra note 10, at 519-20.
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troublingly, returned erroneous guilty verdicts against innocent
accuseds. 239  These types of criticisms likely struck a chord with
the JSRC members, as one of the traditional principles of the
Japanese judicial system is a commitment to accuracy and
uniformity.240 Moreover, media coverage of American criminal
trials, such as the O.J. Simpson trial, have become widespread
throughout Japan, which could have affected the council
members' perceptions about the effectiveness of American juries
in reaching just results.24 1
Whereas the first category of criticisms related to the
effectiveness of American juries, the second category concerned
the adoption of any type of all-citizen jury system in Japan. These
criticisms focused on the historical and cultural differences
between Japan and the countries with an all-citizen jury system
such as the United States, 242 alleging that these differences resulted
in American citizens being "more conscious of public interests"
than Japanese citizens.24 3 Consequently, American citizens
theoretically would be better equipped to serve on an all-citizen
jury than would Japanese citizens, who would need more guidance
regarding their role in the administration of justice.24 4 In fact, the
239 JSRC, 30th Meeting Minutes (Sept. 12, 2000),
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai30/30gijiroku.html [hereinafter 30th Meeting];
Katsuta, supra note 10, at 514-15. For more information, see also "The Opinion of the
Supreme Court on Lay Participation," a document presented during the 30th meeting,
which is available at http://www.kantei.gojp/jp/sihouseido/dai30/30bessi5.html.
240 See Weber, supra note 192, at 153-55 (noting that the Supreme Court advocated
for maintaining a strongly hierarchical system in the judiciary because "Japan's unitary
system . .. provided fair and predictable decisions"); see also Senger, supra note 11, at
753 (discussing concerns raised by the Japanese Supreme Court regarding
unpredictability in the English and American jury systems).
241 See Katsuta, supra note 10, at 499-500 (discussing the influence of American
media outlets on the Japanese view of the American judicial system). In fact, the O.J.
Simpson trial was explicitly referenced at the 30th Meeting. See 30th Meeting, supra
note 239.
242 See 30th Meeting, supra note 239; see also Katsuta, supra note 10, at 514-15
(summarizing viewpoints of two contributors).
243 Katsuta, supra note 10, at 521.
244 See 30th Meeting, supra note 239. In fact, at least one legal expert suggested
during the 30th meeting that a mixed court tribunal would better serve Japan's interest.
See id. This view has been termed by one scholar as "The Enduring Myth of the
Immature Japanese Public," which is the idea that "the average Japanese citizen lacks the
political maturity to participate in governance." Weber, supra note 192, at 157-60.
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Japanese Supreme Court at one time recommended that citizens
should be able to participate and give their opinions in
proceedings, but that they should not have any decision-making
authority.2 45
It was not until the JSRC's 51st meeting on March 13, 2001
that Professor Masahito Inouye, a JSRC member, first presented
materials regarding the saiban-in seido as an alternative to both
the American jury system and the traditional mixed-court tribunals
of Europe.246 Although there had been some discussion of a "lay
judge system" in a prior meeting,247 the precise structure and
function of the saiban-in seido appears to have been both
introduced to, and deliberated on by, the JSRC at this single
meeting. 248 Many aspects of the saiban-in seido remain the same
since its unveiling at the 51st meeting, and any differences relate
to aspects of the system in which Professor Inouye had not
provided definitive suggestions.249
The JSRC issued its final recommendations for judicial reform
on June 21, 2001 ("JSRC Report"). 25 0 As in the "Points at Issue in
the Judicial Reform" nearly two years earlier, the JSRC Report
reiterated the need for Japanese citizens "to break out of the
excessive dependency on the state, . . . develop public
consciousness within themselves, and become more actively
involved in public affairs."2 51 Simultaneously, the judicial branch
was charged with "meeting the demand for accountability to the
245 Weber, supra note 192, at 155.
246 JSRC, 51st Meeting Minutes (Mar. 13, 2001) [hereinafter 51st Meeting],
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai51/51gijiroku.html; see also Fukurai, People's
Panels vs. Imperial Hegemony, supra note 192, at 321-22 (discussing Professor Inouye's
contribution to the creation of the saiban-in seido).
247 See JSRC, 45th Meeting Minutes (Jan. 30, 2001),
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai45/45gijiroku.html (including a general
discussion of lay judges).
248 See id; see also Fukurai, Japan's Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems, supra
note 1, at 804-05.
249 See Fukurai, People's Panels vs. Imperial Hegemony, supra note 192, at 321-22.
250 Id. at 322; see also JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL: FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE
21ST CENTURY (June 12, 2001) [hereinafter JSRC REPORT], available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html.
251 JSRC REPORT, supra note 250, ch. IV.
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people, while paying heed to judicial independence." 25 2  In
explaining the purpose behind recommending the saiban-in seido
in particular, the JSRC noted that the system must "enabl[e] the
broad general public to cooperate with judges by sharing
responsibilities, and to participate autonomously and meaningfully
in deciding trials."5 There, the citizen jurors "should possess
generally equivalent authority to that of judges" in deliberations.25 4
Although the JSRC Report included general descriptions about
the roles and divisions of responsibility between the professional
judges and citizen jurors, it left several issues unaddressed. Three
issues are of importance to this Article. First, the JSRC Report did
not specify the number of professional judges and citizen jurors
that would serve together on a panel or how the panel would reach
a verdict; it stated that those decisions should be made by:
[G]iving consideration to the need to ensure the autonomous and
meaningful participation of the saiban-in and the need to ensure
the effectiveness of the deliberations, taking into account the
seriousness of the cases to which this system will apply and the
significance and potential burden of the system on the general
public. 55
Second, the JSRC Report did not address the number or
composition of votes that would be required to render a verdict or
impose punishment, but it did state that a guilty verdict could not
be rendered "on the basis of a majority of either the judges or the
saiban-in alone."256 Third, although the JSRC Report stated that
citizen jurors and professional judges should make joint decisions
on guilt and punishment, the question of "whether saiban-in
should be involved in highly specialized or technical matters such
as questions of law or questions of procedure" was not
252 Id. ch. I.
253 Id. ch. IV.
254 Id.
255 Id; see also Anderson & Nolan, supra note 168, at 947-48 (describing several
proposals that had been considered regarding the composition of the saiban-in panels).
256 JSRC REPORT, supra note 250, ch. IV; see also Anderson & Nolan, supra note
168, at 949-50 (discussing options regarding voting rules).
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addressed.25 7 The Report nevertheless stressed that "while judges
and saiban-in share responsibilities, the judges who are legal
specialists and the saiban-in who are laypersons will share their
respective knowledge and experience through mutual
communication and reflect the results thereof in their
judgments."25 8
Following the issuance of the JSRC Report, the Japanese
Cabinet established the Office for the Promotion of Justice System
Reform, which created an investigation committee to determine
how to implement the saiban-in seido.2 59 Those efforts culminated
in the Diet's enactment of the Saiban-in Act.260
B. Features of the Saiban-in Seido
The saiban-in seido is a system of joint judicial decision-
making that is unlike any other in the world.2 6 ' The purpose of the
saiban-in seido, as indicated by the Saiban-in Act, is to "contribute
to the promotion of the public's understanding of the judicial
system and thereby raise their confidence in it."262
The saiban-in seido is applicable to two categories of criminal
cases: crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment and crimes
punishable by at least one year in prison, where the victim died as
a result of an intentional criminal act.263 Subject to limited
exceptions, the accused has no right to forego the saiban-in seido
and have the case heard by a panel of professional judges.26 4
257 JSRC REPORT, supra note 250, ch. IV.
258 Id
259 Fukurai, Japan's Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems, supra note 1, at 804-05.
260 Saiban-in Act, supra note 137; see also Fukurai, Japan's Quasi-Jury and Grand
Jury Systems, supra note 1, at 804-05 (describing the process in which the Saiban-in Act
came to fruition).
261 Legal experts have referred to the saiban-in seido as "a new species" that is "as
isolated as the Galapagos." Editorial, Three Professional Judges in Black Robes Have
Traditionally Presided Over Proceedings at the Tokyo District Court[] [O]n Monday,
They Were Joined by Six Private Citizens in Ordinary Attire to Help Pass Judgment in a
Murder Trial,
ASAHI SHIMBUN/INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (HERALD ASAHI), Aug. 5, 2009.
262 Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. I.
263 Id. art. 2; see also Court Act, Act No. 59 of 1947, art. 26(2)(ii) (specifying
crimes falling under this provision).
264 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 3; see also Soldwedel, supra note 204, at
1424-25 (noting that although defendants may not choose to waive trial by saiban-in
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Japanese citizens are eligible to serve as jurors if they are at least
twenty years of age, have completed compulsory education
(equivalent to a ninth-grade education), have not spent time in
prison, and are not prevented from serving due to physical or
mental infinnities.26 5 Most individuals connected with the legal
profession, the court system, or prominent political offices are
ineligible for service.2 6 6
Typically, saiban-in panels are composed of nine participants:
six citizen jurors and three professional judges.267 If there is "no
dispute concerning the facts" and issues during the pre-trial
procedure, and if the court determines that it is appropriate, the
panel may be composed of five participants: four citizen jurors and
one professional judge.26 8
At trial, the citizen jurors have essentially the same rights and
responsibilities as the professional judges; consistent with the
Code of Criminal Procedure, jurors are permitted to ask questions
to witnesses,269 Victims,270 and even defendants.271' Nevertheless,
the Saiban-in Act instructs "[j]udges, prosecutors, and defense
counsel .. . to make trials quick and easy to understand so that lay
[jurors] are able to perform sufficiently their duties without their
responsibility becoming onerous."272 This provision reiterates a
desire that was expressed by the JSRC to limit the burdens of the
citizen participants in the saiban-in seido.2 73
panel, cases will be heard by professional judges where "conditions make it difficult to
guarantee lay judge participation").
265 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, arts. 13-14. Although the qualification
requirements are less stringent than under the pre-war jury system, there is some concern
that the requirements still exclude too many citizens from participating in the saiban-in
seido. See Levin, supra note 11, at 220-21. But see Weber, supra note 192, at 166
(contending that qualification requirements will promote citizen participation).
266 Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 15; see also Levin, supra note 11, at 221
(discussing the exclusion of legal professionals).
267 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 2(2).
268 Id. art. 2(3).
269 Id. arts. 56-57.
270 Id. art. 58.
271 Id. art. 59.
272 Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 51.
273 See JSRC REPORT, supra note 250, ch. IV (noting that final decisions regarding
the implementation of the system must "tak[e] into account the seriousness of the cases
to which th[e] system will apply and the significance and potential burden of the system
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One difference between the powers of citizen jurors and
professional judges is that the decision-making authority of citizen
jurors is limited.2 74 Whereas the entire panel has the authority to
determine the existence of facts and the application of laws and
regulations to the facts,275 only the professional judges may make
decisions regarding court procedure and the interpretation of laws
and regulations.2 76  During full panel deliberations, one of the
professional judges (designated the "presiding judge") is to
instruct jurors regarding these latter issues, and jurors are required
to make determinations in accordance with these instructions.27 7
The presiding judge must also ensure that the "deliberations are
easily understandable for the lay [jurors], providing sufficient
opportunity for the lay [jurors] to voice their opinions ... so that
lay [jurors] are sufficiently able to execute their duties." 27 8
Additionally, in rendering decisions, citizen jurors and
professional judges "are both entrusted to decide freely based on
the strength of the evidence."27 9
In contrast to the rules regarding deliberations on decisions to
be made by the entire panel, only the professional judges are
generally permitted to attend the deliberations on the decisions
entrusted to them alone.2 80 The professional judges, at their
discretion, may jointly agree to allow citizen jurors to attend these
deliberations and express opinions on the matters.28 1
Regardless of whether the panel for a particular trial consists
of nine members or five members, all decisions as to guilt or
punishment must be supported by a majority of panel members.28 2
Furthermore, no decision will be binding unless it is supported by
on the general public").
274 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 6(l)-(2).
275 See id. art. 6(1).
276 See id art. 6(2).
277 Id. art. 66.
278 Id. art. 66(5).
279 Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 62. Notably, the title for Article 62 may be
translated as the "Principle of Free Conviction." Anderson & Saint, supra note 137, at
268.
280 Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 68(1).
281 Id. art. 68(3).
282 Id. art. 67.
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at least one citizen juror and one professional judge.28 3  It is
important to note that, because of the citizen-juror to judge ratio in
panel compositions, this extra requirement is only an issue when a
decision is supported by five or six citizen jurors on a nine-
member panel (or alternatively three or four citizen jurors on a
five-member panel) but not supported by any judge.284
When there is no consensus on the sentence to be imposed:
[T]he number of opinions for the option most unfavorable to the
defendant will be added to the number of opinions for the next
favorable option, until a majority opinion of the members of the
judicial panel which includes both a[] [professional] judge and a
[citizen juror] holding that opinion is achieved.
In effect, this rule dictates that the votes for the most punitive
punishment are added to the votes of progressively more lenient
punishments until there is a majority "vote" that includes at least
one professional judge and one citizen juror.28 6 At the conclusion
of a case, all decisions concerning guilt or punishment, whether
they involve errors of law or fact, are subject to immediate
appeal. 287
Citizen jurors are expected to perform their duties with
"honesty and fairness," and they must not "commit acts that may
injure the public's trust in the fairness of the trial" or the "dignity
of the trial."2 88 The greatest responsibility placed on citizen jurors
is to not divulge "secrets" learned in the course of deliberations or
in carrying out their duties.289 Unlike the other responsibilities of
283 Id.; see also Anderson & Saint, supra note 137, at 273 n.49 (explaining an
exception to this general rule that requires acquittal when five or six lay jurors vote for
acquittal even without the consenting vote of any judge).
284 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 67.
285 Id. art. 67(2).
286 See id.
287 See id. art. 84; see also Soldwedel, supra note 204, at 1445-46 (indicating the
retention of the koso appeal on all issues of law and fact and arguing that it is not
protective enough of defendant's rights).
288 Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 9.
289 See id. art. 9(2); Matthew J. Wilson, Japan's New Criminal Jury Trial System: In
Need of More Transparency, More Access, and More Time, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 487,
516-19 (2010) (explaining the confidentiality provisions).
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citizen jurors, the divulging of secrets is criminalized under the
Saiban-in Act, carrying a potential term of imprisonment of six
months or a fine of 500,000 yen ($6,500).290
C. Initial Impact of the Saiban-in Seido on the Japanese
Judicial System
Although the adoption of the saiban-in seido was intended to
promote broad citizen participation and instill confidence in the
judicial system, Japanese citizens were initially unreceptive to the
idea of serving as citizen jurors.29 1 A February 2005 poll
conducted by the Cabinet Office found that 70% of respondents
did not want to participate in the saiban-in seido.292 In another
poll, respondents cited the following reasons for not wanting to
serve: "'the responsibility to decide another's fate is too great'
(75%); 'lay people cannot try a case without legal knowledge'
(64%); and 'lay people cannot deliberate as equals with
experienced and professional judges' (55%)."q293
In the five-year gap between the passage of the Saiban-in Act
and its implementation, the Supreme Court, the Ministry of
Justice, and the JFBA launched a comprehensive public relations
campaign geared toward educating citizens about their new role in
the judicial system.294 In the first three years following the
enactment of the Saiban-in Act, the Supreme Court spent 3.6
billion yen ($47 million) on advertising, and the Ministry of
Justice spent 970 million yen ($12.6 million) on advertising.2 95
While these initiatives in one sense were intended to promote the
290 Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 79.
291 See, e.g., 70% of Survey Respondents Do Not Want to Become "Citizen Judge,"
KYODO NEWS, Apr. 16, 2005 (reporting survey results).
292 GOVERNMENT INFORMATION OFFICE, MINISTER'S SECRETARIAT, CABINET OFFICE,
PuBLIc OPINION SURVEY ON JURY SYSTEM (Feb. 2005), available at
http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h 16/hi 6-saiban/index.html.
293 Shinomiya Satoru, Defying Experts' Predictions, Identfying Themselves as
Sovereign: Citizens' Reponses to Their Service as Lay Judges in Japan, 43 Soc. Sa.
JAPAN 8, 9 (Sept. 2010) (quoting a May 2008 survey conducted by the Supreme Court).
294 Wilson, The Dawn of Criminal Jury Trials in Japan, supra note 185, at 860; see,
e.g., Saiban-in (Lay Judge) System, THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,
http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/issues/issues03.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
295 See Wilson, Japan's New Criminal Jury Trial System, supra note 289, at 493-94
(chronicling the advertising and promotion efforts).
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saiban-in seido, many materials used had a strong educational
component; the materials explained to the Japanese public the role
of citizen jurors in relation to other components of the judicial
system.2 96
Despite efforts to enhance the public's perception of the
saiban-in seido, as well as significant expenditures toward
remodeling the courts for the introduction of citizen jurors,297
Japanese citizens remained resistant to saiban-in service.29 In a
Cabinet Office poll conducted around the time saiban-in trials
were scheduled to begin, 71.5% of respondents indicated they
were "willing" to participate as citizen jurors.29 9  Although this
result was more favorable than in previous polls, only 13.6% of
respondents indicated they would take part "regardless of [their]
legal obligation" to do so; 57.9% of respondents said they felt
legally obligated to serve.3 00 This negativity led several scholars
to speculate that the saiban-in seido would follow a similar
trajectory as the pre-war jury system-"an expensive experiment
in futility."30'
Although it is too soon to tell whether the saiban-in seido will
be a long-term success in Japan, the initially negative perception
of the system seems to have lessened among the Japanese public,
especially among those who have participated as citizen jurors.302
296 See Wilson, The Dawn of Criminal Jury Trials in Japan, supra note 185 and
accompanying text.
297 See Wilson, Japan's New Criminal Jury Trial System, supra note 289, at 494
(noting that by the end of 2008, facility remodeling costs and other preparatory
expenditures exceeded 28.6 billion yen (S350 million)).
298 See Norimitsu Onishi, Japan Learns Dreaded Task of Jury Duty, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2007, at Al; Start of Lay Judge System: Candidates Anxious Over Dispensing
Justice, DAILY YOMIURI, May 21, 2009, at 1.
299 GOVERNMENT INFORMATION OFFICE, MINISTER'S SECRETARIAT, CABINET OFFICE,
PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY ON JURY SYSTEM (June 2009), available at
http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h21/h21-saiban/index.html; see also Over 70% Willing to
Take Part in Lay Judge Trials: Survey, KYODO NEWS, July 25, 2009 (reporting survey
results).
300 Over 70% Willing to Take Part in Lay Judge Trials: Survey, supra note 299.
301 Wilson, Japan's New Criminal Jury Trial System, supra note 289, at 496-99.
302 See, e.g., SUPREME COURT OFFICE, SAIBAN-IN SAIBANO NO JISSI NI JOKYONI
TSUITE: SEIDO SHIKo-HEISEI 22 NEN 5 GATSU MATSU-SOKUHO [THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE QUASI-JURY TRIAL: BULLETIN REPORT BY THE END OF MAY 2010] (2010) [hereinafter
MAY 2010 REPORT], available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/about/iinkai/saibanin-kondan/siryo_09/pdf/siryo-2.pdf.
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Of qualified candidates who were summoned to the courthouse to
serve as citizen jurors from May 21, 2009 to May 31, 2010, 82.6%
appeared for duty,30 3 a number which dwarfs the 45% attendance
rate for prospective jurors in the United States.30 4 The Japanese
Supreme Court Office has conducted several surveys on jurors'
feelings about serving on saiban-in panels; although a majority of
jurors were initially reluctant to serve,3 0 s over 96% of jurors felt
satisfied after their saiban-in seido experiences.30 6 While most
jurors (77.6%) have been satisfied with their level of involvement
in the proceedings and deliberations, only a few jurors (7.7%) felt
that they could not fully discuss matters before the court.307
There are also indications that the public perception of the
saiban-in seido has increased due to the public's exposure to the
system in action.30 Ever since August 3, 2009, saiban-in trials
have been a staple in Japanese newspapers, with coverage
including both trivial and non-trivial cases. 309 Citizens who have
witnessed the system firsthand remark that although they initially
had "great interest and anxiety," they found that "watching the
303 See id; see also Fukurai, Japan's Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems, supra
note 1, at 815-16 (summarizing results).
304 Lewis, supra note 2 (noting that the 95% turnout rate in Tokyo in the first few
months after the introduction of the saiban-in seido was "more than double the national
turnout rate of 45 percent for American jury trials").
305 SUPREME COURT OFFICE, SAIBAN-IN TO NI TAISURU ANKE-TO: CHOSA KEKKA
HOKOKUSHO: HEISEI 22 NEN 1 GATSU - 4 GATUBUN [SURVEY OF THE QUASI-JURY
PARTICIPANTS: INVESTIGATIVE REPORT BETWEEN JANUARY AND APRIL 2010] 7 (2010),
available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/about/iinkai/saibanin-kondan/siryo 09/pdf/siryo_3.pdf;
see Satoru, supra note 293, at 9 (summarizing survey results).
306 See Satoru, supra note 293, at 9; Fukurai, Japan's Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury
Systems, supra note 1, at 817-18 (describing the results of two surveys conducted by the
Supreme Court Office); see also Makoto Ibusuki, "Quo Vadis? ": First Year Inspection
to Japanese Mixed Jury Trial, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 24, 44-46
(2010) (discussing the positive experiences of citizen jurors during the first year of the
saiban-in seido).
307 SUPREME COURT OFFICE, supra note 305, at 7; see Satoru, supra note 293, at 10
(summarizing results).
308 Setsuko Kamiya, Citizens Find Their Place on the Bench: Lay Judge Duties
Weigh on Candidates, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/ (search
"Citizens Find Their Place on Bench;" select first search result).
309 lbusuki, supra note 306, at 25-26 (providing first-hand impressions of media
coverage in Japan).
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new system in action helped alleviate some of their concerns." 10
Makoto Ibusuki, a law professor at Seijo University in Tokyo, has
noted from his observations of Japanese courtrooms that the
saiban-in seido "now presents itself as an integral part of the
Japanese justice system.""'
With regard to the trial proceedings, there is anecdotal
evidence that citizen jurors have taken an active role in directly
questioning witnesses and defendants, and juror questions have
been included in newspaper coverage of saiban-in trials.3 12
Although most juror questions have not contained questionable
content, there have been a few notable reported instances in which
jurors have asked inappropriate questions or made inappropriate
statements.3 13 In one rape trial, after receiving no response from a
defendant regarding whether he felt remorse for his actions, one
juror exclaimed, "You piss me off."3 14
The initial impact of the introduction of the saiban-in seido
appears to be a positive one, at least as it pertains to increasing
citizens' understanding of the judicial system and augmenting
participation in the democratic process." It is still unclear,
however, how much of a practical impact citizen jurors have in
reaching verdicts,31" and the anti-disclosure provisions of the
310 Kamiya, supra note 308.
311 Ibusuki, supra note 306, at 25.
312 See Senger, supra note 11, at 761-62 (discussing the attention given to juror
questions in early trials under the saiban-in seido); Kamiya, supra note 308 (noting that
all participants in the first trial asked questions); Setsuko Kamiya, Historic First: Lay
Judge Quizzes Witness, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 5, 2009),
http://www.japantimes.cojp/text/nn20090805a3.html.
313 See, e.g., Jury Member Loses Cool in Miyagi High School Girl Rape Case,
JAPAN TODAY (Nov. 20, 2009, 10:09 AM),
http://www.japantoday.com/category/crime/view/jury-member-loses-cool-in-miyagi-
high-school-girl-rape-case.
314 Id.; see also Heavy Sentence in Aomori Case 'Reflects' Public Sentiment
Against Leniency, DAILY YOMFURI, Sept. 12, 2009, at 4 (questioning the role of citizen
jurors in sexually-related crimes).
315 See supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
316 See Ibusuki, supra note 306, at 40-44 (discussing the initial impact of the saiban-
in seido on guilt and sentencing). It appears that the impact of the saiban-in seido is
greater with regard to sentencing than as to guilt. See id To date, there have been a total
of eight acquittals rendered by saiban-in panels. See Data Base of Wrongful Arrests,
Convictions, and the Death Penalty, JAPAN RES. AND DEATH PENALTY CTR.,
http://www.jiadep.org/DataBases.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2012) (providing
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Saiban-in Act make it nearly impossible to study the nature of the
interaction between citizen jurors and professional judges. Yet the
"success" of any particular jury system should not be linked to a
particular conviction rate or punishment level; rather, a system's
success should be measured by how effectively it comports with
its purposes. It is this larger question of purpose to which this
Article next turns.
V. Evaluating the Saiban-in Seido in Light of the
Founders' Conception of the Right to Trial by Jury
As explained in Part III, the circumstances in Japan in the late
twentieth century were analogous to those in America at the time
of the Founding, particularly in regards to the perception of the
criminal justice system and the need for citizen participation in the
administration of justice. Furthermore, most of the initial
discussions about the reintroduction of citizen participation in
Japan focused on the introduction of an American-inspired jury
system. Yet, as described in Part IV, the saiban-in seido differs in
fundamental ways from the modern American jury system. Such
differences should give pause to academic and legal professionals
who have interest in reforming criminal jury trials in the United
States. This Part aims to address whether there are aspects of the
saiban-in seido which better effectuate, or could better effectuate,
the Founders' conception of the right to trial by jury. This Part
also offers suggestions for modifications of the saiban-in seido to
ensure that it meets its own stated purposes.
Although the saiban-in seido shares some characteristics with
other international lay assessor systems, its combination of
components-and, in particular, its implementation of these
components-makes it unique. This Part focuses on three
components of the saiban-in seido: (1) citizen participation in
deciding issues of law; (2) the mixed court and the method of joint
decision-making on issues of guilt and sentencing; and (3) the
inability of criminal defendants to waive trial by the saiban-in
panel and opt for trial by professional judges. While there are
aspects of the saiban-in seido that make it impractical to adopt in
its entirety in the United States,317 there are also aspects of the
information on all of the acquittals).
317 For example, Japanese reforms did not take into account the rights of defendants,
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saiban-in seido that are arguably more in line with the Founders'
conception of the right to trial by jury than the modem American
jury system.
A. Citizen Participation in Deciding Issues ofLaw
1. Advantages
At the time of the Founding, it was taken for granted that
American juries had the authority to decide both issues of law and
issues of fact."' Although some scholars have suggested that the
authority to decide issues of law at the time of the Founding was
due to the lack of a professional judiciary,3 19 a closer look at the
historical context and writings of the Founders indicates that the
authority to decide issues of law fits within the Founders'
conception of the right to trial by jury.3 20
As demonstrated by the Zenger trial, the law-finding function
of the jury was used by the Founders as a tool for resisting
governmental oppression.32 ' In Notes on the State of Virginia,
Thomas Jefferson wrote that it was "usual" for jurors to decide
issues of fact and defer to judges on issues of law; nevertheless, he
explained, "if [a] question relate[ed] to any point of public liberty,
or if it [was] one in which the judges [could have] be[en]
suspected of bias, the jury [would] undertake to decide both law
and fact."322
which are central to constitutional criminal procedure in the United States. See
Anderson & Nolan, supra note 168, at 941 (noting that the JSRC reforms were not meant
to address the rights of criminal defendants). See generally Soldwedel, supra note 204
(describing the ways in which the Japanese judicial system does not protect the rights of
criminal defendants).
318 See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
319 See, e.g., Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 86, at 903-06 (suggesting that the jury's
role in deciding issues of law could be traced to the lack of a professional judiciary); see
also Harrington, supra note 52, at 378-79 (suggesting that judges' lack of formal training
allowed juries to play a significant role in deciding issues of law).
320 McClanahan, supra note 8, at 810-13.
321 See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also ABRAMSON, supra note 93, at
73-75 (discussing the role of the Zenger trial in combating governmental oppression).
322 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1781-1782), reprinted in
WRITINGS, supra note 64, at 256. See also 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 362 (N.Y. 1804)
(expressing the sentiment of Alexander Hamilton that "it is not only the province of the
jury, in all criminal cases, to judge of the intent with which the act was done, as being
parcel of the fact; they are also authorized to judge of the law as connected with the fact.
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In addition to the expectation that jurors would use their law-
deciding power to act as a check against judicial overreaching, the
Founders envisioned that the jury's right to decide issues of law
would be similar to the role of the lower house in the "bicameral
judiciary."3 23 In explaining the role of the judge and jury in
deciding issues of law, James Wilson, a contributor to the
Constitution, wrote: "Suppose that ... a difference of sentiment
takes place between the judges and the jury with regard to a point
of law[;] .. . what must the jury do? The jury must do their duty
and their whole duty. They must decide the law as well as the
fact."3 2 4 Wilson further explained the types of resources that
should be relied upon by jurors in making such decisions,
including "precedents, and customs, and authorities, and
maxims."32 5 Fairly read, Wilson envisioned the jury as a bona fide
actor in the judicial system, deciding issues of law alongside
judges.326
In some ways, the saiban-in seido creates the opportunity for
citizen participants to have even more direct input in the
interpretation of laws and regulations than American jurors
presently have. Unlike the American concept of jury nullification,
in which the jury's law-finding function is ascertained through its
rendering of a general verdict,32 7 the Saiban-in Act affords citizen
participants, under certain circumstances, the opportunity to state
their opinions on the interpretation of laws and regulations.32 8
When such exchanges occur, the citizen participants can be seen
as a lower house in a "bicameral judiciary."32 9 The citizens'
opinions are not binding on judges, but judges are able to consider
the opinions in the context of rendering a specific decision on an
. . . In England, trial by jury has always been cherished, as the great security of the
subject against the oppression of government; but it never could have been a solid refuge
and security, unless the jury had the right to judge of the intent and the law.").
323 McClanahan, supra note 8, at 826.
324 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 2, at 540 (1967).
325 Id. at 542.
326 McClanahan, supra note 8, at 812.
327 See infra note 355 and accompanying text.
328 See supra notes 274-81 and accompanying text; see also Levin, supra note 11, at
222-23 (discussing citizen jurors' input into deciding issues of law).
329 McClanahan, supra note 8, at 826.
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interpretation of a law or regulation.330 In contrast, a general
verdict at best gives a blunt, post-hoc signal to the judiciary that
"either . . . the law itself is oppressive or . . . its application against
a particular defendant would be oppressive."3 3 1  Consequently,
citizen participation in the Japanese system could occupy a more
central role in the administration of justice than its American
counterpart-affecting not only the lives of individual defendants
but also the interpretation of the laws and regulations themselves.
2. Drawbacks
In theory, the saiban-in seido allows more direct citizen input
into the interpretation of laws and regulations than does the
American jury system. Nonetheless, the Saiban-in Act contains
two sets of provisions that greatly limit the likelihood that jurors
will actually influence the law-deciding function of the court.332
While it is true that citizen jurors may have the opportunity to
attend the deliberations in which professional judges discuss the
interpretation of laws and regulations, the attendance of citizen
jurors at these deliberations is not required or even presumptively
permitted.333 Instead, citizen jurors may only attend and give their
opinions if the professional judges jointly agree to their
attendance. 3 4 The Saiban-in Act does not provide a methodology
for determining when citizen jurors should be included in these
deliberations, nor does it discuss if or how citizen jurors may
request to take part in the deliberations.3 35
Notably, the JSRC Report specifically left open the question of
whether citizen jurors would determine the interpretation of laws
330 Levin, supra note 11, at 222 ("Although the act provides that the professional
judges will make the final decision regarding legal issues, it nevertheless suggests that
the chairing judge may allow the lay assessors to participate in the decisions." (citing
Anderson & Nolan, supra note 168, at 948)).
331 Levin, supra note 11, at 223 (comparing the saiban-in seido to the American
jury system).
332 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, arts. 66 and 68(3); see also infra notes 334-43
and accompanying text.
333 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 68(3).
334 Id.
335 See id. (explaining that the professional judges "may allow [jurors] to hear the
deliberations [of the judges] and they may ask [jurors'] opinions," but not describing any
additional details of the process).
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and regulations.33 6 The provisions that were ultimately adopted
seem to reflect two concems expressed by those opposed to the
introduction of citizen participation in the judicial system. First,
the Saiban-in Act was designed to minimize the burden of
participating on a saiban-in panel.3 37 This concern for citizens is
expressed throughout the Act, including in a command to those
connected with the judicial system "to make trials quick and easy
to understand so that lay [jurors] are able to perform sufficiently
their duties without their responsibility becoming onerous."338 The
desire to reduce the burden on citizens explains, at least in part,
why jurors are not expected to attend deliberations involving the
interpretation of laws and regulations.
Second, many experts, including some members of the JSRC,
were worried that the introduction of citizen participation would
decrease uniformity in decision-making,3 39 particularly given the
Japanese citizens' lack of understanding of their legal rights.34 0
This latter concern may explain why citizen jurors have been
given no authority to determine issues of law, even in tandem with
professional judges.
The citizen jurors' lack of participation in law-related
deliberations is compounded by the fact that the Saiban-in Act
specifically requires jurors to make determinations in accordance
with the presiding judge's instructions on the interpretation of
laws and regulations.3 4' Although the propriety of jury
nullification is intensely debated among legal scholars,342 there is
336 See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
337 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 51.
338 Id.
339 See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
340 See supra notes 239-45 and accompanying text.
341 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 66; see also Levin, supra note 11, at 22-
23 (explaining the procedure by which judges and citizen jurors make decisions).
342 See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REv. 253,
312-22 (1996) (proposing alternatives to jury nullification); Parmenter, supra note 35, at
402-27 (advocating for the retention of jury nullification); Richard St. John, Note,
License to Nullify: The Democratic and Constitutional Deficiencies of Authorized Jury
Lawmaking, 106 YALE L.J. 2563, 2565 (1997) (arguing that juries should not have the
power to nullify). Included in discussions of jury nullification is the extent to which it
permits jurors to consider other characteristics of the defendant, such as race. See, e.g.,
Paul Butler, Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995)
(advocating in favor of race-based jury nullification); see also Andrew Leipold, The
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no doubt that jury nullification gives American jurors the power,
albeit indirectly, to decide issues of law through the rendering of a
general verdict.343 The Saiban-in Act's mandate that jurors make
determinations in accordance with the presiding judge's
instructions, in combination with its mandate that all decisions be
supported by at least one professional judge,344 accords citizen
jurors no opportunity to collectively affect a decision if they
believe that the presiding judge's instructions on the law are
incorrect.
The Saiban-in Act thus provides a limited opportunity for
citizen jurors to listen to and participate in deliberations on issues
of law. The role of the citizen juror in the Japanese system is
somewhat analogous to the role of judges in colonial
Massachusetts; they may share their understanding with the
ultimate decision makers, but they have no authority in the
decision-making process.34 5 In fact, citizen jurors in Japan have
even less input than did judges in colonial Massachusetts, for
citizen jurors cannot even share their opinions unless the judges
agree to allow them to participate in their deliberations.34 6
3. Recommendations
Given the importance the Founders placed on allocating to
jurors the authority to decide issues of law, the American judicial
system should consider incorporating citizen input into the
interpretation of laws that come before the court. Such citizen
input would promote the Founders' conception of the jury,347 in
that it would put citizen jurors in a position to meaningfully
participate in the democratic process and learn more about the law
as they deliberate with judges.
On the other hand, if a system similar to the saiban-in seido
Dangers ofRace-Based Jury Nullification: A Response to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L.
REv. 109 (1996) (arguing that race-based jury nullification disadvantages African-
Americans).
343 See infra note 355 and accompanying text.
344 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 67.
345 See NELSON, supra note 82, at 3 (explaining the decision-making powers of
juries in colonial Massachusetts).
346 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 68(3).
347 See supra notes 321-24 and accompanying text.
7792012]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
were to be adopted in the United States, several modifications
would be necessary to ensure that the system would better
effectuate the Founders' conception of the right to trial by jury.
The deliberation provisions of the Saiban-in Act would need to
be revised so that citizen jurors have the option to attend
deliberations and share their opinions, irrespective of whether
professional judges wish them to attend. As it stands, citizen
participation is at the will of professional judges,3 48 which lessens
the likelihood that citizens will broadly participate in deciding
issues of law. Furthermore, it is problematic to allow professional
judges to be the "gatekeepers" of citizen participation, since one of
the purposes behind allowing citizen participation is so that
citizens may operate as a check on governmental and judicial
overreaching.34 9 If citizens are not permitted to attend
deliberations, their exclusion limits the transparency of the system
and increases the chances that such overreaching will continue.
In addition to giving jurors an invitation to attend and
participate in deliberations, the saiban-in seido voting rules would
need to be modified to allow jurors to vote on the interpretation of
at least some laws and regulations. There are various ways that
this could be accomplished. For instance, citizen jurors could be
obligated to attend and vote on issues of law in instances where
there is no consensus among the professional judges.
Alternatively, such procedures could be triggered whenever one of
the parties puts an issue of law squarely before the panel. No
matter how such a procedure is implemented, it is important-both
to the role of the citizen juror as a meaningful participant in the
democratic process, and to the importance of the jury in the
administration of justice-that jurors have not only an opportunity
to share their viewpoints, but also a meaningful opportunity to
have their viewpoints shape the decision-making of the court.
348 See, e.g., Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 68(3) (exemplifying a provision of
the Saiban-in Act in which the professional judges determine whether or not citizen
jurors will participate in deliberations).
349 See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
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B. The Mixed Court and Joint Decision-making as to Guilt
and Punishment
1. Advantages
Since the saiban-in seido consists of citizen jurors and
professional judges sitting together on the same panel, it shares
many similarities with other "mixed court" tribunals. Several
scholars in the 1980s and 1990s, including most notably John H.
Langbein, lauded the virtues of mixed court tribunals, and in
particular the German system.5 o Much of the positive response to
mixed court tribunals was related to their efficiency and greater
accuracy in fact finding; there was only limited discussion about
whether mixed court tribunals advanced the Founders' conception
of the right to trial by jury.3"' At most, the scholarship posited that
mixed court tribunals did not contravene the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury.352
In fact, one can argue that mixed court tribunals further the
Founders' conception of the right to trial by jury, and in particular
its role of increasing citizen participation in the democratic
process. Unlike all-citizen jury systems such as those in the
United States, in a mixed court tribunal citizen jurors and
professional judges deliberate together on the merits of cases.353
During these deliberations, citizens should have an opportunity to
learn more about the law and the workings of the judicial system
directly from professional judges, fulfilling the educational role of
jury service.3 54 Just as important, however, is the potential for
350 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's
Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931 (1983)
(proposing that a mixed court tribunal could operate as an alternative to the plea
bargaining system in the United States); John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court:
Could the Continental Alternative Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J.
195 (1981) (arguing that principles of the mixed court system would better suit the
purposes of America's right to trial by jury); Douglas G. Smith, Structural and
Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48
ALA. L. REv. 441 (1997) (advocating reforms of the American jury system based on
aspects of the civil law system).
351 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 350, at 201-02.
352 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 350, at 936-37.
353 Bloom, supra note 186, at 39-40 (describing the method of joint deliberation and
decision-making in mixed court tribunals).
354 See id
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professional judges to interact with, and learn from, citizen jurors.
This feedback is missing from American jury trials in criminal
cases, except perhaps indirectly through the rendering of general
verdicts.3 55
Mixed court tribunals provide for joint decision-making not
only in rendering verdicts, but also in determining sentencing.356
With few exceptions, there is no opportunity for jurors in the
modern American system to participate in the determination of
sentencing."' This lack of participation is in contrast to the jury
system at the time of the Founding, when jurors were generally
afforded more participation in sentencing."' Opportunities for
citizen participation enabled jurors to mitigate sentences when
they felt that the law was too harsh, either as applied to the
defendant or in relation to all defendants.3 59 Citizen participation
on mixed court tribunals could theoretically serve the same
purpose, with the additional advantage of providing a forum for
citizen jurors and professional judges to jointly discuss and decide
the appropriate sentence for a particular defendant.
In addition to the benefits that stem from mixed court
tribunals, the saiban-in seido has other aspects that further
promote the Founders' conception of the right to trial by jury.
First, the composition of the tribunals and method of rendering
decisions are unique; as discussed in Part IV, a panel generally
consists of six citizen jurors and three professional judges.360
While the composition of mixed court tribunals varies around the
world, in Japan, the two to one ratio and large number of jurors on
each panel serve to increase the amount of citizen participation on
355 Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1297, 1301-02 (2000) (explaining that a general verdict provides very limited
information, if any, on the reasons for a jury's decision).
356 See Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVis L. REV.
95, 171-72 (1996) (claiming that joint deliberations on sentencing determinations
promote citizen participation in the administration of justice).
357 See supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
358 See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
359 See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
360 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 2(2). The potential numerical
composition of a tribunal is discussed more extensively in supra notes 267-68 and
accompanying text.
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each case and in the judicial system as a whole."' All decisions
must be supported by a majority of panel members, including at
least one citizen juror and one professional judge.36 2  It follows
that citizen jurors and professional judges each have the collective
power to veto a decision by the other group. Such veto power is
consistent with the concept of the "bicameral judiciary," since at
least one member from each group is needed to concur in a
decision.
Second, citizen jurors in Japan serve only on one case, which
increases the breadth of citizen participation in the judicial
system.36 3 In the German system, by contrast, citizens are selected
for four-year terms; such lengthy terms arguably "professionalize"
the jury and decrease the breadth of citizen participation.3 64
2. Drawbacks
When Japan announced its intention to adopt a mixed court
tribunal instead of an all-citizen jury system, several scholars
criticized the decision.36 5 Much of this criticism was due to the
German system, which has been the most studied of the mixed
court tribunals.3 6 6 The German system has been characterized as
one of "U]udicial dominance,"3 67 in which "jurors are likely to
361 See Weber, supra note 192, at 165 (noting that the Japanese system promotes
more citizen participation than other mixed court tribunals such as the German system
due to the number of citizen jurors and the ratio between the citizen jurors and
professional judges).
362 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 67. This unique feature of the Act is
discussed more extensively in supra notes 282-86 and accompanying text.
363 Indeed, the JSRC recognized this benefit in issuing its recommendations for
reform. See JSRC REPORT, supra note 250 ("To provide the opportunity to as many
people as possible and to avoid excessive burden on those selected, new saiban-in should
be selected for each specific case and should be released when they have served for the
entire case up through the judgment on it.").
364 Kiss, supra note 138, at 271-72. Kiss argues that the professionalism of the
German jury "may diminish the effectiveness of' the system. Id.
365 See, e.g., Katsuta, supra note 10; Kodner, supra note 160, at 245-54; Landsman
& Zhang, supra note 169, at 194-97; Levin, supra note 11, at 216-19.
366 See generally Landsman & Zhang, supra note 169, at 194 (discussing the
German system).
367 Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REv. 547, 580 (1997).
2012] 783
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. XXXVII
defer to the judge too often and too quickly."3 68 Empirical studies
substantiate these observations, as citizen participation has been
shown to affect the determination of guilt in only 1.4% of cases.369
Furthermore, citizen participants in the German system have taken
a passive role during trial; although they are technically permitted
to ask questions, they rarely do so.o Therefore, the role of citizen
participants in the German system is seen as symbolic rather than
as meaningful."'
Initially, at least, it appears that the Japanese system is faring
better than the German system at encouraging citizen jurors to
actively participate during trial.3 72 The reasons for this difference
may be attributable to how the saiban-in seido was conceived and
implemented. The JSRC Report and Saiban-in Act both provided
that citizen jurors were to be accorded the same authority as
professional judges to participate during trial and in deliberations,
"entrust[ing] [them] to decide freely based on the strength of the
evidence."3 73 During the interim period between the enactment of
the Saiban-in Act and the first trial under the system, judges
participated in a series of mock trials to ensure that they would not
368 Jenia lontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REv. 311,
375 (2003); see also Landsman & Zhang, supra note 169, at 194-95 (criticizing the
German system).
369 Langbein, supra note 350, at 204 (summarizing the results of an empirical study
conducted by Casper and Zeisel).
370 Dubber, supra note 367, at 582; Kodner, supra note 160, at 249.
371 Dubber, supra note 367, at 582; see also Levin, supra note 169, at 217
(explaining that judges often negotiate settlements to avoid any citizen participation in
cases). In addition to concerns about the functioning of the German system, some
scholars warned that a mixed court tribunal would be especially prone to judicial
dominance in Japan. See, e.g., Kiss, supra note 138, at 275. According to this theory,
the hierarchal nature of Japanese society would cause citizen jurors to defer to the
decision-making of professional judges on the panel, because the judges would be
considered a higher authority. Id. Anderson and Nolan have rejected this claim, calling
it a "rather simplistic cross-cultural assumption of automatic difference." Anderson &
Nolan, supra note 168, at 988. They note that the judicial system reforms were aimed at
increasing the autonomy of Japanese citizens, and thus the reforms may themselves have
the effect of reducing deference to authority. See id.
372 See Ibusuki, supra note 306, at 44-46 (discussing positive impact of saiban-in
seido); Senger, supra note 11, at 761-62, 765-66 (noting that the Japanese response to
the system may be "[b]etter than expected").
373 Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 62.
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unduly influence citizen jurors.3 74 Although the Saiban-in Act did
not contain specific guidance on how deliberations should be
conducted, the Japanese Supreme Court has implemented rules to
further encourage citizen participation in deliberations."' For
instance, professional judges are instructed "to state their opinion
[on an issue] only after [citizen] jurors have stated theirs." 6 In
addition, judges are to try to refrain from "actively persuading
jurors" at the beginning of deliberations in order to allow for a free
and open conversation about the evidence.3 77 The comprehensive
public relations campaign launched by the Japanese Supreme
Court and Ministry of Justice further served to educate the
Japanese public about the saiban-in seido and the rights and duties
of citizens who participate in saiban-in trials.s
Notwithstanding the perceived differences between the
Japanese and German systems, there are some aspects of the
structure of the saiban-in seido and its method of decision-making
that limit its ability to fully promote the Founders' conception of
the right to trial by jury.
First, little is known-or lawfully can be known-about the
actual deliberations between the citizen jurors and professional
judges. That is because the Saiban-in Act has imposed strict
confidentiality provisions, violations of which may result in fines
or imprisonment."' These confidentiality provisions thwart the
optimal functioning of the jury system because it is unknown
whether the "judicial dominance" that is characteristic of the
German system is actually occurring in Japan behind closed
doors.o Nor are there any exceptions to the confidentiality
provisions in cases of citizen juror or professional judge
misconduct."' More fundamentally, the confidentiality provisions
374 See Weber, supra note 192, at 163.
375 Id.
376 Id.
377 Id
378 See supra notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
379 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 79.
380 See Levin & Tice, supra note 206 (noting that the secrecy provisions "may chill
or bar reports of irregular or illegal procedures"); Wilson, Japan's New Criminal Jury
Trial System, supra note 289, at 539-41 (explaining how misconduct or judicial
domination could go unchecked under the current system).
381 Wilson, Japan's New Criminal Jury Trial System, supra note 289, at 540.
2012] 785
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
restrict the ability of citizen jurors to meaningfully discuss the
substance of their experiences with others in the community.38 2 If
the saiban-in seido is meant to be used as a tool to teach citizens
about their role in the democratic process, as the Founders would
have intended, the provisions unnecessarily restrict the reach of
that tool to those persons who happen to be selected for jury
service.8 Such a limited reach is also contradictory to the stated
purpose of the Saiban-in Act, which is to "promot[e] ... the
public's understanding of the judicial system and thereby raise
their confidence in it." 3 84
Second, the procedure for determining sentencing does not
promote meaningful citizen participation or deliberation. Unlike
the rules for rendering verdicts, which require a majority of panel
members to concur to render a binding decision, there is no
requirement that a majority of panel members reach the same
sentence.3 85 Instead, the Saiban-in Act lays out a rule in which the
five (or, in the case of an uncontested trial, three) most punitive
punishments are grouped together, and the least punitive option
among them becomes the sentence.38 6 In effect, this rule of
convenience eliminates the need for panel members to jointly
deliberate on sentences, as a consensus need not be reached in
order to render a binding decision." Instead, a sentence merely
reflects the median sentence of panel members."
Third, the requirement that sentencing decisions include at
least one professional judge limits the authority of citizen jurors to
determine sentences free of judicial control, particularly in non-
contested cases, where there is only one judge on the panel.389
There is also evidence that judges provide jurors information
relating to the typical sentences of similarly situated defendants at
382 Id. at 534-37.
383 See Levin & Tice, supra note 206 ("Thus we find it profoundly ironic that the
[Saiban-in Act], which clearly states its purpose is to promote citizen understanding,
employs a harsh secrecy regime that operates in opposition to the law's intended
purpose.").
384 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 1.
385 See id art. 67.
386 See id
387 See id.
388 See id
389 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 67.
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the outset of sentencing deliberations,390 contrary to their
obligation to refrain from unduly influencing deliberations.
3. Recommendations
Given the history of the all-citizen jury system in the United
States, it is difficult to imagine a complete transformation to a
mixed court tribunal similar to that in Japan. Indeed, there are
some scholars who suggest that such a system would in fact
contravene the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, as
interpreted in Duncan v. Louisiana.' On the other hand, it is
more likely that joint decision-making would be possible in
connection with sentencing, since the determination of sentences
has been shared between judges and juries in some states at earlier
times in American history.39 2
If a mixed court panel similar to that in Japan were to be
adopted in the United States for purposes of determining
sentencing, several modifications to the system would need to be
made. The confidentiality provisions, while promoting free
exchange of ideas during deliberations, ultimately do not ensure
adequate citizen participation and understanding of the judicial
system. At the very least, exceptions to the confidentiality
provisions should be made for allegations of misconduct.39 3
Optimally, all post-trial confidentiality restrictions would be
eliminated so that jurors could freely discuss their experiences
with other citizens.394 Informal discussions extend the educational
benefits of jury service beyond those who directly participate in
the system. 395
390 See Weber, supra note 192, at 157 (noting that professional judges share
information on sentencing with citizen jurors); see also Yuji Shiroshita, Current Trends
and Issues in Japanese Sentencing, 22 FED. SENT'G REP. 243, 246 (2010) (discussing the
Japanese Supreme Court sentencing database and its accessibility to citizen jurors).
391 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Richard S. Frase, Comparative
Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How
Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 542, 676-77 (1990).
But see Langbein, supra note 350, at 215 (claiming that the mixed court tribunal may
provide enough "alternative safeguard[s]" to make it constitutionally permissible).
392 See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
393 See Levin & Tice, supra note 206.
394 Id.
395 See Wilson, Japan's New Criminal Jury Trial System, supra note 289, at 526-37
(advocating for relaxation in confidentiality rules, in part, to increase the educational
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In addition to relaxing or eliminating the confidentiality
provisions of the Saiban-in Act, measures would need to be
included to ensure that citizen participants and members of the
judiciary have the opportunity to jointly deliberate and decide on
an appropriate sentence. Although a rule of convenience such as
that in the Saiban-in Act is understandable, given the desire to
minimize the burden on citizen participants, such a rule should not
automatically take effect after the first vote. Instead, such a rule
should take effect only in an instance in which there have been
substantial deliberations and there is a deadlock on the appropriate
sentence to impose. Furthermore, there should be no requirement
that a professional judge be included in the majority. To the
extent that there is concern that citizen jurors might impose a
sentence that is too harsh, such a concern is addressed by allowing
a defendant to appeal the sentence, subject to a deferential
standard such as the abuse of discretion standard currently used in
federal courts.
C. Defendant's Inability to Waive Trial by Saiban-in Panel
1. Advantages
At the time of the Founding, the right to trial by jury was not
conceived of as solely an individual right, to be exercised at the
option of the accused.39 6 To the contrary, Article III of the
Constitution dictates that "the trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by
jury," which indicates that the right was intended to be an integral
part of the structure of government.3 97 Indeed, the Founders'
conception of the right to trial by jury, including its function as a
check on the judiciary and other branches of government, would
be diminished if defendants were permitted to waive jury trials and
have their cases heard by judges.398 Furthermore, if a substantial
portion of defendants opted to waive jury trials, the number of
waivers would likewise decrease citizen participation in the
judicial system, and, ultimately, the role that the jury plays in the
administration of justice.
aspects of jury reform); see also Levin & Tice, supra note 206 (criticizing the
confidentiality and secrecy rules in the Saiban-in Act).
396 AMAR, supra note 6, at 104; see also Gardina, supra note 134, at 374-77.
397 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Gardina, supra note 134, at 377-78.
398 Gardina, supra note 134, at 377-78.
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The pre-war jury system in Japan provides an apt example of
the potential detrimental impact of giving defendants an option to
waive trial by jury. Despite its relatively high acquittal rate and
initially positive response, defendants increasingly opted to waive
jury trials-so much so that there were only two jury trials in the
final year of the pre-war jury system.3 99 Given the lack of citizen
participation in the pre-war jury system, it is not surprising that the
Saiban-in Act does not allow defendants to waive jury trials.4 00
Nevertheless, this view of the Founders' conception of the
right to trial by jury is in direct contrast to that espoused in Patton
v. United States,4 0 ' in which the Supreme Court held that
defendants may be given the option to waive trial by jury.402 The
Patton Court's characterization of the right to trial by jury as a
right of the accused has been strongly criticized by scholars,
including Akhil Amar.403 Amar has taken issue with the Patton
Court's description of the historical right to trial by jury and its
blanket statement that "[t]he record of English and colonial
jurisprudence antedating the Constitution will be searched in vain
for evidence that trial by jury in criminal cases was regarded as a
part of the structure of government."40 4 As discussed in Part II.B,
the right to trial by jury was in fact conceived primarily as a part
of the structure of government. To that end, a defendant should
not have the option to exclude the "lower bench" from
participating in the administration of justice.405
2. Drawbacks
Assuming that a criminal defendant's inability to waive trial
by saiban-in panel is consistent with the Founders' conception of
the right to trial by jury, the only outstanding concern is whether
the proper cases are tried by the saiban-in seido. Unlike the pre-
399 Vanoverbeke, supra note 183, at 25.
400 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
401 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
402 Id. at 308.
403 AMAR, supra note 6, at 104-05.
404 Patton, 281 U.S. at 296.
405 See AMAR, supra note 6, at 104 (noting that the "bicameral analogy is
historically apt" when considering a jury's role and whether defendants should have the
right to waive jury trials).
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war jury system, which excluded several categories of cases
involving the government,406 the saiban-in seido applies to all
cases punishable by death or life imprisonment and crimes
punishable by at least one year in prison in which the victim died
as a result of an intentional criminal act.407 Examining the process
by which Japanese reformers considered which categories of cases
should be subject to the Act, it appears that the decision was based
solely on the ideal number of cases that could be heard by the
system.408 The basis of such a decision should not be the ideal
caseload, but rather the types of cases in which citizen
participation would be most beneficial. 40 9  For instance, it is
unclear why the system generally excludes crimes punishable by
one-year imprisonment, except for cases in which the victim dies
as a result of an intentional act.4 10
Even more troubling than the arbitrary nature of the crimes
subject to the system is the authority of the prosecutor's office to
charge a crime in such a way that it falls inside or outside the
Saiban-in Act.4 1' There is evidence that prosecutors' offices have
been exercising this authority since the introduction of the saiban-
in seido; for instance, a prosecutor dropped a charge of "rape
resulting in bodily injury" and instead indicted the defendant on a
charge of "rape," which falls outside the Saiban-in Act.4 12 This
exercise of prosecutorial discretion likely explains why the
number of saiban-in trials in the first year was approximately forty
percent lower than the number had been expected at the time of
the introduction of the saiban-in seido.413 Given that one of the
driving forces behind judicial reform was the perception that
prosecutors were unduly influencing criminal trials, this type of
discretionary charging authority is problematic.4 14
406 See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
407 Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 2; see also Court Act, supra note 263
(specifying crimes falling under this provision).
408 Anderson & Nolan, supra note 168, at 950-52.
409 See id.
410 Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 2.
411 Anderson & Nolan, supra note 168, at 953; Ibusuki, supra note 306, at 50-51;
Levin, supra note 11, at 211-12.
412 Ibusuki, supra note 306, at 50-51.
413 See id. at 39, 51.
414 See Levin, supra note 11, at 211-12.
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3. Recommendations
Because the right to trial by jury concerns the relationship
between the citizen participants and other parts of government,
rather than solely the relationship between the accused and the
judicial system, criminal defendants charged with serious offenses
should not have the option of waiving trials. Although the Saiban-
in Act ostensibly ensures that saiban-in panels hear serious
crimes,4 15 careful consideration was not given to the types of cases
that should be heard by the system. Furthermore, the Saiban-in
Act does not address the loophole that allows prosecutors' offices
to exercise their charging discretion to effectively remove cases
from the saiban-in seido.416 This loophole is exacerbated by the
arbitrary distinctions between the types of crimes that are subject
and not subject to the Act.4 17 If the saiban-in seido were to be
adopted in the United States, these types of loopholes would need
to be eliminated so that the proper cases would be heard by jurors.
VI. Conclusion
The Saiban-in Act is scheduled for review and possible
modification in May 2012, three years after the introduction of the
saiban-in seido.4 18 At that time, there will undoubtedly be much
discussion about whether the saiban-in seido has met its stated
goals and how the system can be refined to increase its success.
While the saiban-in seido was ostensibly adopted for the purpose
of providing meaningful citizen participation in the judicial
system, there are aspects of the system that limit its effectiveness
as a democratic tool. Moreover, it appears that other practical
concerns-including the desire for uniformity in decision-making
and the desire to limit the burden on citizen participants-have
resulted in compromises that give too much authority to
415 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, art. 2 (listing the crimes covered by the Act).
416 See supra notes 411-14 and accompanying text.
417 See supra notes 411-14 and accompanying text.
418 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, supp. art. 8; see also Press Release, Japan
Fed'n of Bar Ass'n, Bill on Lay Judge Sys. and Crim. Pro. Reform Clears Lower House
(Apr. 23, 2004), available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en (select "News Release;"
select "2004;" select "2004/04/23, Bills on Lay Judge System") ("The Government will
review the . . . saiban-in system after 3 years of its enforcement and, if necessary, take
appropriate measures to ensure that this new criminal trial system is functioning
effectively as a foundation of the judicial system in Japan.").
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professional judges.
Despite its limitations, the saiban-in seido is a new category of
citizen participation system. On the one hand, it was designed as a
broad citizen participation system similar to that of the United
States.4 19 On the other hand, its makers eschewed an all-citizen
jury system in favor of a mixed court tribunal, but its composition
and voting rules are distinct from other mixed court tribunals.42 0
The saiban-in seido was designed to promote joint deliberations
between citizen jurors and professional judges, albeit behind
closed doors and subject to strict confidentiality restrictions.4 2 1
The Saiban-in Act even provides an opportunity for citizen jurors
to express their views on issues of law, although this opportunity
is limited to instances in which professional judges agree to allow
citizen participation.42 2 Defendants do not have the right to waive
trials that are subject to the system, but there are no assurances
that the proper cases will be heard by saiban-in panels.42 3
Given the similarities between the Founders' conception of the
right to trial by jury and the goals for judicial reform in Japan,
those interested in jury reform should consider the saiban-in seido
as an alternative model to that of the United States. While the
system's approach to deciding issues of law and method of joint
decision-making in sentencing show promise, perhaps those
reviewing the Saiban-in Act in 2012 will continue refining the
system so that it better promotes its stated goals-as well as our
own.
419 See Levin, supra note 11, at 205-06.
420 See id. at 207-11.
421 See id. at 206 (discussing the goals of the saiban-in seido).
422 See Saiban-in Act, supra note 137, supp. art. 68(3).
423 See supra notes 406-16 and accompanying text.
792 [Vol. XXXVII
